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I. Introduction
The principle is imbedded in our constitutional system that
there are certain essentials of liberty with which the state is
not
entitled
to
dispense
in
the
interest
of
experiments. . . . [T]he theory of experimentation in censorship
was not permitted to interfere with the fundamental doctrine
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of the freedom of the press. The opportunity to apply one’s
labor and skill in an ordinary occupation with proper regard
for all reasonable regulations is no less entitled to protection. 1

After the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, the monks at St.
Joseph Abbey in Louisiana sought a new source of income. 2 They
began producing simple wooden coffins priced at much lower
rates than caskets sold in funeral homes. 3 After the Abbey had
made a large investment in its business, St. Joseph Woodworks, 4
the Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors
ordered it to close. 5 Although the monks did not provide funeral
or embalming services, a Louisiana statute regulating the funeral
industry prohibited the monks from selling coffins. 6 Under the
statute, “funeral directing” included “any service whatsoever
connected with . . . the purchase of caskets or other funeral
merchandise.” 7 The statute additionally specified that only
licensed funeral directors operating out of “duly licensed
Louisiana funeral establishment[s]” could engage in funeral

1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932).
2. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 2013)
(explaining that the hurricane destroyed timberland that was the Abbey’s main
source of income).
3. See id. (“St. Joseph Woodworks offered one product—caskets in two
models, ‘monastic’ and ‘traditional,’ priced at $1,500 and $2,000 respectively,
significantly lower than those offered by funeral homes.”).
4. See id. (noting that the Abbey invested approximately $200,000).
5. See id. at 219 (explaining that, after the Board ordered the Abbey not to
sell caskets, a member of the Board who owned several funeral homes
subsequently initiated formal complaint proceedings).
6. See id. at 218 (discussing restrictions the statute placed on the Abbey);
see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:831(42)–(46) (2013) (providing definitions for
funeral directing and funeral establishment and addressing unlawful practices
in the funeral industry), invalidated in part by St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712
F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013). In St. Joseph Abbey, the Court invalidated the
language of subsection (42) when it found that the provision restricting the right
to sell funeral merchandise to licensed funeral directors improperly granted
funeral directors exclusive control over intrastate casket sales. See St. Joseph
Abbey, 712 F.3d at 222–23 (discussing the legislative intent behind the statute).
At the time St. Joseph Abbey was decided, the subsection was numbered (37).
See id. at 224 n.5 (citing to § 37:831(37)).
7. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:831(42), invalidated by St. Joseph Abbey v.
Castille, 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013).
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directing. 8 Even though Louisiana did not require a casket for
burial, nor did any law prevent a customer from building his
own or purchasing one out of state, 9 the monks were unable to
sell their caskets in Louisiana. 10 Obtaining the necessary
credentials was both cost and time prohibitive, leaving the
monks out of business. 11 They sought relief from the legislature
without success before turning to the courts. 12 The problem St.
Joseph Abbey faced is one that many individuals attempting to
enter a profession or open a new business share: occupational
licensing.
Occupational licensing is a “process where entry into an
occupation requires the permission of the government, and the
state requires some demonstration of a minimum degree of
competency.” 13 Many professionals are licensed, including
architects, 14 polygraph examiners, 15 nurses, 16 auctioneers, 17

8. Id. § 37:848(A)–(C).
9. See St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 217–18 (“Louisiana does not regulate
the use of a casket. . . . Individuals may construct their own caskets for funerals
in Louisiana or purchase caskets from out-of-state suppliers via the internet.
Indeed, no Louisiana law even requires a person to be buried in a casket.”).
10. See id. at 218 (noting that, despite a lack of regulations for casket use
and quality, the Abbey was required to shoulder “significant regulatory
burdens”).
11. See id. at 219 (explaining that becoming a licensed funeral
establishment has a number of specific building regulations and requires the
establishment to employ a licensed funeral director, who has his own set of
regulations: an education requirement, an apprenticeship, and an exam—all to
sell coffins).
12. See id. at 219–20 (explaining that the Abbey unsuccessfully petitioned
the legislature for an exception for “charitable organizations” before bringing a
suit for injunctive relief).
13. Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, 14 J. ECON. PERSPS. 189,
191 (2000).
14. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-406 (2015) (requiring architects to obtain
licenses before practicing).
15. See id. § 54.1-1801 (“All polygraph examiners shall be licensed
pursuant to this chapter.”).
16. See id. § 54.1-3017 (providing licensing guidelines for registered
nurses).
17. See id. § 54.1-603 (requiring a license for a person or a firm selling at
auction).
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social workers, 18 cosmetologists, 19 real estate appraisers, 20 and
cemetery operators. 21 The list of occupations subject to licensing
can be quite absurd; states have required licenses for fortune
tellers, manure applicators, and cat groomers, to name but a
few. 22 Occupational licensing is the strictest form of employment
regulation; it is “often referred to as ‘the right to practice.’” 23 It
fits within the state’s right to control commerce and is part of its
police powers. 24 Practicing without a license may carry criminal
penalties, civil penalties, or both. 25
18. See id. § 54.1-3706 (“In order to engage in the practice of social work, it
shall be necessary to hold a license.”).
19. See id. § 54.1-703 (“No person shall offer to engage in or engage in
barbering, cosmetology, nail care, waxing, tattooing, body-piercing, or esthetics
without a valid license issued by the Board.”).
20. See id. § 54.1-2011 (requiring licenses for real estate appraisers).
21. See id. § 54.1-2311 (“No person shall engage in the business of a
cemetery company in the Commonwealth without first being licensed by the
board.”).
22. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational
Licensing, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 216–18 (2016) (listing occupations
subject to licensing).
23. Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of
Occupational Licensing 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
14308, 2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14308. There are less restrictive
means of occupational regulation, such as registration, which requires a
practitioner to provide identification before practicing, sometimes with a filing
fee. See id. (describing registration). Certification allows any person to perform
the task, but a government or agency-administered exam certifies an
individual’s skill and knowledge. See id. (describing certification procedures).
The fact that there are other effective state-endorsed methods of occupational
regulation is significant because this Note advocates applying intermediate
scrutiny to occupational licensing challenges. Infra Part IV.D.
24. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per
curiam) (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local
economies under their police powers.”); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,
791–93 (1975) (explaining that states have “a compelling interest in the practice
of professions within their boundaries and . . . have broad power to establish
standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions”);
License Cases, 46 U.S. 504, 583 (1847) (explaining that police powers include
“sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its
dominion”).
25. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-111 (2014) (criminalizing practicing a licensed
profession without a license and providing criminal and civil penalties); see also
Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1135 n.244
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Licensing statutes present a hurdle to entering the workforce
because licensed professions usually require significant training
hours, exams, and fees to practice. 26 Some statutes also require
licenses both for a place of business and for its proprietor, with
separate regulations for each. 27 Many requirements may be too
expensive, time-consuming, arbitrary, or difficult for some
aspirants to meet, locking them out of their intended profession. 28
Occupations are primarily regulated by state licensing
boards composed of active professionals, political appointees, and,
occasionally, members of the public appointed by an executive
official. 29 Licensing boards operate with a certain amount of selfinterest because, by creating restrictive entry criteria and
influencing training and education requirements, they can limit
competition and control the market for professional services. 30
(2014) (referring to research showing that the majority of licensing boards in
Tennessee and Florida have criminal sanctions available for individuals
practicing without licenses).
26. See DICK M. CARPENTER ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, LICENSE TO WORK: A
NATIONAL STUDY OF BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 8 (2012),
https://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/economic_liberty/occupational_licensing/lic
ensetowork.pdf (identifying the average requirements for 102 licensed
occupations across all fifty states and the District of Columbia).
27. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2810 (2014) (requiring “funeral
establishments” to be licensed and to employ a full-time licensed funeral
director); id. § 54.1-2811 (providing an exhaustive list of building regulations for
“funeral service establishments” and authorizing the Board to adopt further
regulations as necessary).
28. See Larkin, supra note 22, at 211 n.3 (describing some of the
mechanisms states use to limit the number of individuals entering a profession
and noting that “[a]t some point, extremely burdensome licensing requirements
have the practical effect of excluding most or all potential entrants”); see also
THE WHITE HOUSE, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY MAKERS
8 (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_
final_nonembargo.pdf [hereinafter OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK]
(noting the disproportionately harmful impact of occupational licensing on
certain populations).
29. See Kleiner, supra note 13, at 191 (describing the composition and
functionality of licensing boards); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2802 (2014)
(“The Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers shall consist of nine members
as follows: seven funeral service licensees of the Board with at least five
consecutive years of funeral service practice in this Commonwealth immediately
prior to appointment and two citizen members.”).
30. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 25, at 1107–10 (describing methods that
licensing boards use to restrict competition).
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Reducing competition can create a significant financial benefit
for members of a licensed profession. 31
The number of professions subject to occupational licensing
has expanded dramatically since the 1950s; 32 29% of workers
are now required to obtain a license before beginning
employment. 33 States license an average ninety-two
occupations. 34 Moreover, the number of professions subject to
licensing will likely continue to grow. Colorado, for example,
has developed licensing requirements for its now-expanding
marijuana industry. 35 The rise of services such as Uber and
Lyft may raise additional licensing questions as entrenched
industries react to newcomers. 36 Occupational licensing statutes
31. See Larkin, supra note 22, at 235–38 (explaining that members of
licensed occupations receive significant financial benefits from limiting the
number of entrants to a profession); see also OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A
FRAMEWORK, supra note 28, at 22 (discussing the influential political role of
licensed professions).
32. See CARPENTER, supra note 26, at 4 (“In the 1950s, only one in twenty
US workers needed the government’s permission to pursue their chosen
occupation. Today that figure stands at almost one in three.”).
33. See Roger V. Abbott, Note, Is Economic Protectionism a Legitimate
Governmental Interest Under Rational Basis Review?, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 475,
476 (2013) (“[T]he percentage of U.S. workers required to obtain state licenses to
practice a trade has increased from five percent in 1950 to at least twenty
percent in 2000 and to twenty-nine percent in 2006.”). State occupational
licenses account for approximately 25% of the United States workforce. See
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK, supra note 28, at 6 (noting that the
percentage of workers subject to occupational licensing is higher when local and
federal licenses are factored in).
34. See ADAM B. SUMMERS, REASON FOUNDATION: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING:
RANKING THE STATES AND EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES 3 (2007), http://reason.org/
files/762c8fe96431b6fa5e27ca64eaa1818b.pdf (“The average number of licensed
job categories is 92 and the median is 90. Seventeen states license more than
100 job categories.”).
35. See Occupational Licensing Information—Marijuana Enforcement,
COLO. DEP’T REVENUE, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/applicationand-licensing-marijuana-enforcement (last visited Feb. 28, 2016) (describing
occupational licensing requirements for individuals working in the medical and
recreational marijuana industries) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
36. See Eduardo Porter, Job Licenses in the Spotlight as Uber Rises, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/business/economy/uberssuccess-casts-doubt-on-many-job-licenses.html?_r=0 (last visited Feb. 28, 2016)
(discussing occupational licensing relating to Uber’s increasing popularity) (on
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may interfere with economic innovations such as Uber, Lyft,
Airbnb, and EatWith. 37
In recent years, there have been a number of legal challenges
to occupational licensing statutes, 38 as well as a movement
towards state-level deregulation. 39 Currently, there is a
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Boris Bindman, Note,
Keep on Truckin’, Uber: Using the Dormant Commerce Clause to Challenge
Regulatory Roadblocks to TNCs, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 136, 173–74
(2015) (discussing business licensing and ride-for-hire services).
37. See Danny Crichton, How 51 Shades of Licensing Is Killing Our
Economy, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 28, 2016), http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/15/how-51shades-of-licensing-is-killing-our-economy/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2016)
(arguing that occupational licensing “has made some fields completely
immune to market forces,” making it more difficult for new companies to
provide new services and products legally) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). As telecommuting and telemedicine gain popularity,
occupational licensing is likely to complicate matters. See OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK, supra note 28, at 28–30 (identifying complications
of telework and licensing—for example, in some states, medical professionals
are required to be licensed in every state they “see” patients).
38. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n,
717 F.3d 359, 365–66 (4th Cir. 2013) (challenging a North Carolina licensing
board that blocked non-dentist teeth whiteners from providing services); St.
Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 2013) (contesting a
Louisiana law restricting intrastate casket sales to licensed funeral
directors); Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2008)
(challenging California licensing requirements for a non-pesticide-using pest
controller); Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1213–14 (10th Cir. 2004)
(challenging an Oklahoma statute restricting casket sales to licensed funeral
directors); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 222 (6th Cir. 2002) (contesting a
Tennessee statute that restricted the right to sell caskets to licensed funeral
directors); Locke v. Shore, 682 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1286 (N.D. Fla. 2010)
(challenging Florida’s licensing requirements for interior decorators);
Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1103 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (arguing
that California’s cosmetology license requirement for hair braiders violated
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); Patel v. Texas Dep’t of
Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 73–75 (Tex. 2015) (challenging Texas
licensing statutes’ training requirements for eyebrow threaders); State v.
Lupo, 984 So. 2d 395, 397–98 (Ala. 2007) (challenging Alabama licensing
requirements for interior designers).
39. Virginia no longer requires hair braiders to obtain a cosmetology
license after a “comprehensive review across state government.” See Hair
Braiding De-regulation FAQs, DEP ’T PROF. & OCCUPATIONAL REG.,
http://www.dpor.virginia.gov/BarberCosmo/Hair_Braiding_Deregulation/ (last
visited Feb. 28, 2016) (explaining the rationale and procedures for hair
braider deregulation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Other states have followed suit on deregulation. Louisiana recently simplified
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significant split between the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Fifth,
Sixth, and Tenth Circuits relating to occupational licensing laws
and casket sales. 40 On February 25, 2015, the Supreme Court
ruled 6-3 in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v.
Federal Trade Commission41 that, when a controlling number of
members of a state board are market participants, the state must
provide active supervision to ensure that any anticompetitive
regulations further state policy, rather than board member
interests. 42 This ruling provides traction for challenges to other
its requirements for licensing florists by eliminating the practical exam. See
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3807(B)(2) (2014) (describing the written exam for a
commercial florist license). Some states are considering large-scale deregulation.
See Molly Wharton, Texas Eyes Major Deregulation, NAT’L REV. (June 27, 2014),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/381431/texas-eyes-major-deregulationmolly-wharton (last visited Feb. 28, 2016) (noting that Texas is considering
deregulating nineteen professions, some of which are in the healthcare industry)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). At least one state is
experimenting with reducing regulations for higher-income professions.
Washington is pioneering a “limited legal license” program that allows
individuals with one year of legal training to provide family law services. See
Leon Neyfakh, How Requiring Too Much Training Hurts Workers and
Consumers Alike, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 11, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/
ideas/2015/01/11/how-requiring-too-much-training-hurts-workers-and-consumersalike/oAXFzNY37P9V9sy9W3WuJM/story.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2016)
(explaining Washington’s new limited legal license program) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
40. Compare St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 227 (5th Cir. 2013)
(finding that economic protectionism is not a legitimate government purpose
and that the act restricting casket sales to licensed funeral homes bore no
rational relationship to consumer protection), and Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d
220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that a Tennessee statute restricting casket
sales to licensed funeral directors did not increase the quality of caskets sold,
but did insulate funeral directors from competition), with Powers v. Harris, 379
F.3d 1208, 1222 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that intrastate economic
protectionism, absent violations of a statute or the Constitution, is a legitimate
state interest and upholding casket sale restrictions).
41. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.
1101 (2015). The FTC had charged the Board with violations of antitrust law
after it acted to restrict competition in the North Carolina teeth-whitening
market. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 717 F.3d
359, 364 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the FTC’s administrative complaint
was based on the Board’s issuance of “at least 47 cease-and-desist letters,”
which “exclude[ed] the non-dentist teeth whiteners from the market”).
42. See N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1106 (holding that a state board with a
majority membership of active market participants must comply with active
supervision requirements to qualify for state-action antitrust immunity).

420

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411 (2015)

licensing boards 43 and requires states to develop clear
supervisory policies. 44 It also signals that the Court may be
willing to limit unreasonable barriers to employment. 45 The
Texas Supreme Court recently upheld a challenge to occupational
licensing statutes for eyebrow threaders, concluding that the
training requirements were so disproportionately oppressive that
they violated the Texas Constitution. 46
This Note explores whether state occupational licensing
statutes that arbitrarily restrict access to a profession violate
constitutional protections of economic activity, and whether the
existing standard of judicial review is sufficient to guarantee
those protections. This Note challenges the assumption that
rational basis review is the appropriate standard and argues that
the Court should, at a minimum, provide limited guidance as to
what constitutes a “legitimate state interest.” 47
Part II discusses the Lochner Era and its impact in
establishing the current standard of judicial review for evaluating
state economic policies. 48 Part III of this Note reviews the
problems caused by arbitrary occupational licensing statutes,
particularly licensing that regulates lower-income occupations. 49
Part III also examines core issues in the split between the Fifth,
Sixth, and Tenth Circuits. 50 Part IV analyzes whether the current
43. See Haw & Edlin, supra note 25, at 1151 (explaining that lifting the
state action ban allows both consumers and competitors to bring antitrust
suits).
44. See N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1112 (“The active supervision
requirement demands, inter alia, ‘that state officials have and exercise power to
review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those
that fail to accord state policy.’” (quoting Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101
(1988))).
45. See id. at 1105–06 (explaining that state licensing boards require active
supervision because their members have incentives to engage in anticompetitive
conduct).
46. See Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 89–
90 (Tex. 2015) (analyzing training hours against training content and the
financial and opportunity costs to conclude that the training requirements
create an unconstitutional burden).
47. Infra Part IV.A.1.
48. Infra Part II.
49. Infra Part III.A–B.
50. Infra Part III.C.
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standard of review—rational basis—is appropriate for challenges
to occupational licensing statutes. 51 Part IV proposes that courts
should apply intermediate scrutiny when reviewing occupational
licensing statutes to protect individual economic liberties. 52 This
Note concludes that, given the scope of occupational licensing, the
importance of the freedom to work, and the harm caused by
existing government practices surrounding licensing, courts
should review occupational licensing statutes under intermediate
scrutiny.
II. The Constitution, the Court, and Economic Liberty
Economic liberty is defined as “the right to acquire, use, and
possess private property and the right to enter into private
contracts of one’s choosing.” 53 The Constitution encompasses
these protections explicitly 54 and implicitly. 55 The freedom to
pursue a lawful occupation of one’s choice is an economic liberty. 56
51. Infra Part IV.A.
52. Infra Part IV.D.
53. Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, 35
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 5 (2012).
54. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No state shall . . . pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or
grant any Title of Nobility.”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty or property; without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation.”).
55. See Barnett, supra note 53, at 6 (arguing that the Ninth Amendment
contains an implicit protection for natural rights and economic freedom).
Barnett argues that the reference to “other rights” in the Ninth Amendment
was initially intended to refer to natural rights, which historically included
property rights. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 55
(2004) (noting that a draft bill found in Madison’s papers referred explicitly to
several “natural rights” that are retained by people when they enter society,
including acquiring property).
56. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 282 U.S. 262, 278 (1932)
(explaining that a regulation that “unreasonably curtail[s] the common right to
engage in a lawful private business . . . cannot be upheld consistently with the
Fourteenth Amendment”); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897)
(noting that Fourteenth Amendment rights include “the right of the
citizen . . . to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation”).
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It is also a fundamental activity protected by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution. 57
A. The Lochner Era
Between the late 1800s and 1937, 58 the Supreme Court
played an active role in protecting economic liberties, including
the right to pursue an occupation. 59 The state could not
excessively regulate private economic affairs unless special
circumstances warranted regulation. 60 This doctrine is described
as “economic due process.” 61 The Court favored a “liberty of
contract” theory that protected an employer’s freedom to contract
with employees. 62 Lochner v. New York 63 is the most notorious
57. See infra notes 288–99 and accompanying text (discussing the
privileges protected by Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution).
58. See ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 131 (1987)
(explaining when the “Lochner Era” began).
59. See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
126 (1980) (explaining that the Justices who favored “substantive due process”
believed that the Constitution “limited the powers of the federal and state
governments over private economic affairs” and government interests had to be
significant to survive judicial review).
60. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915) (finding that interference
with the liberty of contract “must be deemed arbitrary” unless it falls within a
“reasonable exercise of the police power of the State”); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412, 421 (1908) (noting that, although the general right to contract is an individual
liberty, there are certain circumstances in which a state may restrict individual
freedom to contract); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905) (explaining that
statutes that interfere with freedom of contract are not within a state’s police power
unless independent grounds exist that suggest there is “material danger” to the
public or an employee); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391–92 (1898) (noting the
right to contract is subject to certain legitimate exercises of a state’s police powers);
Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 590 (explaining that the legitimate exercise of a state’s police
power “must be left for determination as each case arises”).
61. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 86 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining that
economic due process originated when courts began using the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect against arbitrary and unreasonable legislative interference
with economic rights).
62. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64 (arguing that interfering with the freedom for
“master and employe[e] to contract with each other in relation to their employment”
was a constitutional violation).
63. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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example of economic due process. 64 In Lochner, the Court
overturned a statute that restricted the number of hours a baker
could work per day because it did not sufficiently relate to
protecting the bakers’ health, safety, or morals to qualify as a
legitimate exercise of the state’s police powers. 65 Lochner Era
judicial opinions maintained an unwavering focus on freedom to
contract that sometimes ignored the interests of vulnerable
members of society. 66 Lochner has since become synonymous with
“activist” judges who “did not hesitate to substitute judicial
opinions for the judgments of elected representatives of the
people.” 67
B. Abandoning Economic Due Process
The Court finalized its decision to abandon economic due
process in 1938 in United States v. Carolene Products Company. 68
The appellee, Carolene Products, argued that the Filled Milk
Act, 69 which prohibited the interstate shipment of filled milk,
infringed on its Fifth Amendment equal protection and due
process rights. 70 Justice Stone disagreed, finding instead that the
64. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 1 (2011) (explaining that
Lochner is “likely the most disreputable case in modern constitutional
discourse” and is “shorthand for all manner of constitutional evils”).
65. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57 (finding that there was no reasonable
ground for interfering with the bakers’ right to contract because the bakers were
capable of bargaining for themselves and the law affected neither the “safety,
the morals, nor the welfare of the public”).
66. See COX, supra note 58, at 136 (explaining that the Justices ignored
“large-scale industrial organization, urban squalor, and the helplessness of the
individual in dealing with organized wealth”).
67. Id. at 135.
68. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The Justices had previously signaled the
impending end of economic due process when they upheld the constitutionality
of minimum wage legislation in West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish. See 300
U.S. 379, 398–99 (1937) (affirming that legislation setting a minimum wage for
women legitimately aided state policies protecting public health).
69. Pub. L. No. 67–513, 42 Stat. 1486 (1923) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 61–63
(2012)).
70. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 146–47 (detailing the appellee’s
complaints).
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Act was an appropriate legislative step to protect public health
and safety. 71 He explained that
the existence of facts supporting a legislative judgment is to be
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless in light of the facts made known or
generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators. 72

In a footnote, Justice Stone clarified that the presumption of
constitutionality may have some limitations, such as when the
legislation at issue contradicts the Constitution. 73 “Footnote
Four” has since become famous as the place where the Supreme
Court established rational basis review as the standard for
economic legislation and paved the way for tiers of judicial
review. 74
Rational basis review originated in McCulloch v. Maryland 75
when Chief Justice Marshall announced, “Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the [C]onstitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the [C]onstitution, are constitutional.” 76 Rational basis
review requires only that a law “be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.” 77 As long as the legislation does not
“trammel fundamental personal rights or draw upon inherently

71. See id. at 148–49 (discussing the legislative background of the Act and
noting Congress’s concerns about public health).
72. Id. at 152.
73. See id. at 152 n.4 (“There may be narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced
within the Fourteenth.”).
74. See TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING 125 (2010)
(explaining that Footnote Four “was the birth of the legal notion of ‘tiers of
scrutiny’”).
75. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
76. Id. at 421.
77. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1978) (per curiam).
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suspect distinctions” it is presumed to be constitutional. 78 Courts
will generally uphold laws under rational basis review “if there is
any reasonably conceivable set of facts that could provide a
rational basis.” 79 In establishing rational basis as the basic
standard for reviewing economic policy, the Court embraced the
principles behind Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner and
brought an end to the era of economic due process. 80
C. The Modern Impact and Occupational Licensing
Although Lochner Era cases often trampled legislative
determinations, 81 they also treated economic liberty as an
essential freedom. 82 The Supreme Court’s record on economic
rights is inconsistent—it was overzealous during the Lochner
Era, but it has since weakened 83 and abandoned other
constitutional protections of economic activity. 84 While returning
78. See id. (explaining that legislative actions are generally presumed to be
constitutional).
79. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
80. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s opinion on economic theories is irrelevant
to “the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law”).
81. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the judiciary’s
tendency to ignore legislative determinations during the Lochner Era).
82. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57–58 (arguing that legislation that interferes
with individual freedom to contract for employment must have a legitimate
purpose).
83. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 502
(1987) (analyzing the Contracts Clause and concluding that “[u]nlike other
provisions in the section, it is well settled that the prohibition against impairing
the obligation of contracts is not to be read literally”).
84. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74–75 (1873) (finding that
national citizenship’s privileges and immunities fall solely within the
Constitution and that the Constitution does not extend additional protections to
state citizens; rather, state citizens must look to their own states); see also
Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658, 665 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (noting that the
“effect of the Slaughter-House Cases was to reduce the Privileges and
Immunities Clause to a practical nullity”); BARNETT, supra note 55, at 201
(explaining that the majority opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases “has long
been thought to have gutted the Privileges and Immunities clause of any real
significance” and noting that because of that case, it has “ceased to play any
important function”).
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to economic due process would be unwise, entirely abandoning
judicial scrutiny of economic legislation is just as foolish. 85
Carolene Products placed economic regulations—including
occupational licensing—in the hands of state legislatures, which
have since developed highly protectionist licensing laws that
survive rational basis review. 86 This is in large part because the
Court’s current policy favors deference to legislative
determinations when analyzing economic legislation. 87
Despite these policies, there have been a handful of decisions
suggesting that lower courts are increasingly willing to reject
outrageous licensing schemes. 88 There is also a growing trend
among commentators 89 towards dismantling arbitrary and
85. See infra notes 246–249 and accompanying text (discussing benefits
provided by minimum wage laws and unions).
86. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88
(1955) (“[T]he law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims
to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and
that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational
way to correct it.”); see also ELY, supra note 61, at 140 (explaining that after
1937, the justices “routinely accepted legislative statements of policy, no matter
how implausible, as a basis for upholding regulatory measures”).
87. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 108
(2003) (explaining that the Constitution gives legislatures broad discretion in
establishing tax policy, regardless of favoritism); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S.
1, 10 (1992) (according legislative action the presumption of constitutionality as
long as the conduct furthers a legitimate state interest); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not give federal courts the power to dictate economic or social policies to
the states); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam)
(explaining that the Court defers to legislative determinations and that states
have wide freedom in regulating their economies); Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487
(noting that “it is for the legislature, not the courts to balance the advantages
and disadvantages” of a law).
88. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (listing cases challenging
occupational licensing regulations).
89. See, e.g., Asheesh Agarwal, Protectionism as a Rational Basis?, 3 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 189, 190 (2007) (discussing the impact of the licensing circuit
split on e-commerce and the funeral industry); Edlin & Haw, supra note 25, at
1100 (discussing North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners and arguing
that a state agency made up of market participants should not be granted stateaction immunity when promulgating occupational licensing restrictions); Marc
P. Florman, The Harmless Pursuit of Happiness: Why “Rational Basis with Bite”
Review Makes Sense for Challenges to Occupational Licensing, 58 LOY. L. REV.
721, 725 (2012) (arguing that courts should apply second-order rational basis
review in analyzing occupational licensing laws); Lana Harfoush, Grave
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protectionist occupational licensing statutes. 90 To understand
why some courts are willing to place limitations on state
regulatory power, it is necessary to examine occupational
licensing itself.
III. The Problem of Occupational Licensing
A. Rationales for Occupational Licensing Statutes
Despite its flaws, occupational licensing has social value. It
serves as a form of internal professional regulation. 91 Many
licensed occupations, including the legal profession, are self-

Consequences for Economic Liberty: The Funeral Industry’s Protectionist
Occupational Licensing Scheme, the Circuit Split, and Why it Matters, 5 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 135, 136–37 (2011) (analyzing the casket sales circuit
split and noting its potential impact on anti-competition licensing laws); Larkin,
supra note 22, at 238–44 (analyzing the relationship between occupational
licensing laws and public choice theory); Timothy Sandefur, Is Economic
Exclusion a Legitimate State Interest? Four Recent Cases Test the Boundaries,
14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1023, 1036 (2006) (analyzing rational basis review
and legitimate state interests); Anthony B. Sanders, Casket Regulations Helped
Unearth Economic Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 668, 669 (2004) (discussing Craigmiles and its impact on economic due
process); Austin Raynor, Note, Economic Liberty and the Second-Order Rational
Basis Test, 99 VA. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2013) (arguing that licensing and zoning
laws should be subject to second-order rational basis tests); Joseph Sanderson,
Note, Don’t Bury the Competition: The Growth of Occupational Licensing and a
Toolbox for Reform, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 488 (2014) (proposing statutory
reforms to occupational licensing by using federal administrative review as a
tool).
90. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 227 (5th Cir. 2013)
(finding that Louisiana’s casket sale statute lacks a “rational relation to a
constitutionally permissible objective” and affirming the district court’s
judgment that the statute violated the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses); see also Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 228–29 (6th Cir. 2002)
(finding that the licensure requirement for Tennessee casket sales poses a
barrier to market competition that violates the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses); note 39 and accompanying text (discussing deregulating
licensed professions).
91. See MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS, ENSURING QUALITY OR
RESTRICTING COMPETITION 97–98 (2006) (explaining that the objectives of
licensing statutes are to “increase competence and reduce negligence of
practitioners”).
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regulating. 92 Licensing fees are sources of state revenue 93 and
funding for licensing boards, minimizing the financial impact of
regulation on the state. 94 Licensing provides a means to
guarantee service quality in settings where the consumer lacks
experience or knowledge. 95 The average person on the street is
probably incapable of determining whether or not a surgeon can
competently perform a kidney transplant. State statutes that
create minimum professional qualifications benefit consumers
who are unable to assess service quality without expert
guidance. 96 These qualifications may incentivize professionals to
invest in training and skill development. 97 Self-regulating
professions, however, have a greater risk of regulating in their
own self-interest because they influence entry criteria and
enforce professional regulations. 98
The primary benefit cited for occupational licensing is that it
improves or guarantees service quality. 99 Consumers who use a
92. See Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer
Licensing, 69 MO. L. REV. 299, 305–06 (2004) (noting that licensing laws for
attorneys serve both as a screening mechanism for minimum quality and as a
way to govern professional conduct).
93. See Thomas G. Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J. L. & ECON. 93, 96
(1961) (describing the role taxes play in licensing and regulation).
94. See Kleiner, supra note 13, at 191 (noting that licensing agencies are
“self-supporting by collecting fees and registration charges from persons in the
licensed occupations”); OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK, supra note 28,
at 22–23 (noting that, because licensing fees are the primary method of funding
professional regulation, “legislators considering a new licensing proposal often
do not have to grapple with the prospect of finding additional funding”).
95. See Avner Shaked & John Sutton, The Self-Regulating Profession, 4
REV. ECON. STUDS. 217, 217 (1981) (discussing the rationale for self-regulating
professions).
96. See id. (“The whole rationale for self-regulation, however, rests on the
notion that it provides a vehicle through which the quality of the service may be
maintained in markets where the consumer cannot readily measure this quality
himself.”).
97. See OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK, supra note 28, at 11
(discussing the relationship between occupational licensing, training, and
quality).
98. See Moore, supra note 93, at 97 (arguing that, because entry
requirements are more stringent for self-regulated professions, there is “the
most reason to believe that they are licensed for their own benefit”).
99. See KLEINER, supra note 91, at 7–8 (“The main benefit usually cited for
occupational licensing is improving the quality of services received.”); see also
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licensed professional’s services are more certain of quality,
supposedly increasing demand for licensed services. 100 There is
little evidence, however, that licensing actually improves
quality. 101 Occupational licensing does not guarantee public
safety or product quality. 102 Licensing boards may not effectively
enforce their own regulations, placing the public at risk. 103
Regulating certain licensed professions serves important
public health and safety goals. 104 Licensing standards should not
be universally abolished because ensuring that some professions
strictly regulate who may enter and who may continue to practice
creates tangible social benefits. 105 Some occupational licensing
SANDEFUR, supra note 74, at 145 (explaining that “[t]he justification for modern
occupational licensing is that laws ‘protect the public from dangerous or
incompetent practitioners’”); Kleiner, supra note 13, at 191 (noting that the
suggested primary benefit of occupational licensing is that it improves service
quality).
100. See KLEINER, supra note 91, at 1 (explaining that one reason for the
growth of occupational licensing is the “idea that existence of licenses may
minimize consumer uncertainty of the quality of the licensed service and
increase the overall demand for the service”).
101. See id. at 48–57 (summarizing a number of studies on the relationship
between quality of service and occupational licensing and concluding that “there
is little to show that occupational regulation has a major effect on the quality of
service received by consumers or on the demand for service”); OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK, supra note 28, at 58–59 (summarizing twelve studies
of occupational licensing and noting that only two studies showed any
improvement in quality with licensing).
102. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Because
nothing prevents licensed funeral directors from selling shoddy caskets at high
prices, the licensing requirement bears no rational relationship to increasing the
quality of burial containers.”).
103. See KLEINER, supra note 91, at 9 (noting that complaints to licensing
boards relating to malpractice “found few effects of tougher regulation”); see also
SUMMERS, supra note 34, at 11–12 (noting that licensing boards may “look the
other way” and allow professionals who perform poor work or actively harm
clients to continue practicing); OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK, supra
note 28, at 13 (noting that, although licensing boards use consumer reports to
monitor practitioners, only “a small fraction of consumer complaints result in
any kind of disciplinary action”).
104. See KLEINER, supra note 91, at 1 (noting that failure to properly train
for some occupations can be hazardous, therefore “regulations that require a
practitioner to be trained at a minimum may produce positive social payoffs”).
105. See id. (explaining that, for some occupations, “poor quality has larger
social implications” that may be deadly or dangerous). One example that springs
readily to mind is the medical profession. Indeed, the Supreme Court shares
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statutes, however, require reevaluation because they establish
arbitrary and excessively burdensome entry criteria that unfairly
block individuals from pursuing a profession.
B. The Dark Side of Occupational Licensing
1. Who Is Affected by Occupational Licensing Statutes?
Licensed occupations encompass a wide range, from highearning professions such as doctors, nurses, and lawyers, to lowearning professions such as daycare workers, cosmetologists,
manicurists, and tour guides. 106 Although many professions have
complex licensing requirements, lower earners may be
disproportionately burdened. 107 Occupational licensing statutes
primarily harm individuals who have the greatest need for
economic opportunity: minorities, poor workers, the lesseducated, and people re-entering the work force. 108 Even as
students, law and medical aspirants are more capable of
professional advocacy, have access to greater resources, and are
more familiar with the political process than an eighteen-year-old
high school graduate seeking a cosmetology license. 109

this concern. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, N.C. State Bd. of Dental
Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1105 (Oct. 14, 2014) (No. 13-534)
(“Justice Breyer: I don’t want to suddenly destroy all the temptation of medical
boards throughout the country to decide everything in favor of letting in the
unqualified person, lest he sue them under the antitrust law for treble damages
and attorneys’ fees.”).
106. See SUMMERS, supra note 34, at 1 (noting the range of professions
subject to occupational licensing).
107. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 26, at 7 (noting that license
requirements are “exceptionally burdensome” for lower-income workers because
they lack access to the resources that individuals pursuing high-income
resources have).
108. See id. at 9 (explaining that individuals working in low and moderateincome licensed professions “make less money [and] . . . are also more likely to
be male and racial/ethnic minorities and to have less education”).
109. See Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme
Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34, 50 (“[T]he scattered
individuals who are denied access to an occupation by State-enforced barriers
are about as impotent a minority as can be imagined.”).
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2. The Economic Costs of Occupational Licensing
Licensing has a significant impact on income and earning
potential, but may ultimately reinforce economic inequality. 110
Belonging to an occupation may raise wages as much as 15%. 111
But the time and financial investment to earn an occupational
license can be prohibitive. 112 This is especially problematic for
individuals seeking to re-enter the workforce or open a small
business. 113 Low- and middle-income individuals may not be able
to enter their chosen profession because the costs of licensing are
beyond their means. 114
Furthermore, there is an increasing income gap between
higher-earning and lower-earning occupations. 115 Licensed
professions with higher incomes tend to see increases in wage
growth, whereas lower-income occupations have smaller than

110. See KLEINER, supra note 91, at 6 (“An analysis of income inequality in
the United States has shown that being in an occupation—not just educational
attainment—is an important determinant of growing relative wage differences
among workers.”).
111. See Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 23, at 6 (“The general estimates of
cross-sectional studies using [c]ensus data of state licensing’s influence on
wages with standard labor market controls show a range from 10 to 15 percent
for higher wages associated with occupational licensing.”).
112. See Kleiner, supra note 13, at 192–93 (explaining that, due to licensing
restrictions, some individuals may not be able to pursue a chosen profession
because of artificially inflated costs, training time, or barriers to entry).
113. See CARPENTER, supra note 26, at 6–7 (noting that many lower- to
moderate-income occupations are ideal for individuals entering or re-entering
the economy, or for starting a small business); see also OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK, supra note 28, at 12 (discussing licensing’s impact on
entrepreneurship and self-employment and the limits it places on the job
market).
114. See SUMMERS, supra note 34, at 2 (“[C]ost barriers disproportionately
affect the poorest members of society. . . . Occupations with relatively low startup costs . . . are unattainable because the costs of obtaining a license are too
high.”); OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK, supra note 28, at 12 (“Lowerincome workers are less likely to be able to afford the tuition and lost wages
associated with licensing’s educational requirements . . . .”).
115. See Kleiner, supra note 13, at 196 (“Since occupational licensing
appears to increase earnings, on average for persons in high income occupations
relative to persons in lower income ones, this state and local policy may serve to
exacerbate income dispersion in the United States.”).
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average national growth. 116 Licensing may also have a negative
impact on the supply of professionals in the market, driving up
service costs without a corresponding increase in quality. 117
Multiple studies find that restrictive licensing laws raise prices
on essential services. 118 This harms poor consumers. 119 One
expert on occupational licensing estimates that licensing raises
the cost of services by $116 billion per year. 120
3. The Arbitrary Nature of Occupational Licensing
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires occupational licensing laws to have a “rational
connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice.” 121
But requirements for many licenses are excessive when
considered against the reality of the profession. 122 Shampooing
hair is not a complex task; millions of people do it daily.
Tennessee, however, licenses “Shampoo Technicians,” a
profession that requires a minimum of “300 hours in the practice
116. See KLEINER, supra note 91, at 5–6 (discussing the difference in wage
growth).
117. See id. at 9 (“The dominant view among economists is that occupational
licensing restricts the supply of labor to the occupation and thereby drives up
the price of labor and of services rendered.”).
118. See OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK, supra note 28, at 14
(noting that more restrictive licensing of nurse practitioners “raises the price of
a well-child exam by 3 to 16 percent, and imposing greater licensing restrictions
on dental hygienists and assistants increases the average price of a dental visit
by 7 to 11 percent”).
119. See KLEINER, supra note 91, at 9 (explaining that poorer consumers
may forfeit services due to high costs); SUMMERS, supra note 34, at 29–30 (noting
that the increase in costs due to occupational licensing forces poorer consumers
to pay higher prices).
120. See Stephanie Simon, A License to Shampoo: Jobs Needing State
Approval Rise, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424052748703445904576118030935929752 (last visited Feb. 28, 2016)
(“Kleiner estimates that across the U.S. economy, occupational licensing adds at
least $116 billion a year to the cost of services, which amounts to about 1% of
total consumer spending.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
121. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1972).
122. See Larkin, supra note 22, at 219–20 (noting that professional demands
do not have a relationship with the “stringency of the licensing requirements”
for many licensed professions and citing barbers as an example).
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and theory of shampooing at a school of cosmetology.” 123
Prospective shampoo technicians must also pass both a written
and a practical exam. 124 Although the proper scalp massage for
applying conditioner is rationally connected to working as a
Shampoo Technician, the excessively burdensome license
requirements serve as a barrier to entry. 125
Education and training requirements may also lack a
reasonable connection to the particular profession. 126 Many states
require hair braiders to hold a cosmetology license, but few
cosmetology schools actually teach hair braiding, and the
majority of course hours are simply unnecessary for braiders. 127
Although a handful of states have separate license requirements,
or have deregulated the profession, twenty-four states still
require braiders to obtain cosmetology licenses. 128 In those states,
123. Individual Licensure Requirements, BD. COSMETOLOGY & BARBER
EXAM’RS, http://www.tn.gov/commerce/article/cosmo-shampoo-technician (last
visited Feb. 28, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
124. See id. (describing exam requirements for shampoo technicians).
125. See RULES OF THE TENN. BD. OF COSMETOLOGY, 0440-1-.03(4)(a)–(c)
(2014) (detailing credit hour requirements including instruction in answering
the phone, scalp massage, draping, shampooing, and shampoo and conditioner
composition).
126. See Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1118 (1999) (explaining
that the mandatory curriculum that natural hair braiders must complete to
practice “does not teach braiding while at the same time it requires hair
braiders to learn too many irrelevant, and even potentially harmful, tasks”);
Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 88–89 (Tex. 2015)
(noting that over 40% of training hours for eyebrow threaders are unrelated to
the profession).
127. See Sophie Quinton, States Don’t Understand African Hair Braiding.
That Hurts These Small Business Owners, NAT’L J. (Oct. 2, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/10/states-dont-understandafrican-hair-braiding-that-hurts-these-small-business-owners/431361/
(last
visited Feb. 28, 2016) (explaining that most individuals seeking employment as
hair braiders must become licensed cosmetologists, which requires over 1,600
hours of education, but most programs do not actually teach African hair
braiding) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also PAUL
AVELAR & NICK SIBILLA, INST. FOR JUSTICE, UNTANGLING REGULATIONS: NATURAL
HAIR BRAIDERS FIGHT AGAINST IRRATIONAL LICENSING
8
(2014),
http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/economic_liberty/untangling-regulations.pdf
(“[U]nlike hairstylists or cosmetologists, natural hair braiders do not singe, cut,
bleach or use potentially hazardous chemicals on people’s hair. . . . [T]he vast
majority of these hours are unnecessary.”).
128. See AVELAR & SIBILLA, supra note 127, at 8 (noting that braiders
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aspiring braiders are required to spend between $10,000 and
$20,000 and study from 1,000 to 2,000 hours to earn a license
that does not actually prepare them to work in their intended
profession. 129
Occupational licensing schemes also lack rational
connections between training requirements and the profession’s
importance to public health and safety. 130 One commentator
effectively contrasts the average requirements to earn an
Emergency Medical Technician license with the requirements for
a cosmetology license. 131 The fact that it is more difficult, time
consuming, and expensive to learn to style hair than it is to learn
to properly perform CPR in the back of a moving ambulance
suggests that the relationship between these regulations and
public health interests is tenuous at best. 132 If anything, the
disproportionate nature of these regulations suggests that they
are created by industries to reap economic benefits. 133
The distinction between which professions are regulated and
which are not is also arbitrary. 134 Virginia, for example, regulates
stylists, but not electrologists—individuals who perform
electrolysis. 135 Electrolysis is certainly riskier to a consumer’s
without separate requirements are regulated with cosmetologists and stylists).
129. See id. (identifying the average cost of cosmetology training and the
range of course hours required for cosmetology training).
130. See Larkin, supra note 22, at 220 (noting that the skill and importance
of professions to a community are not indicative of the stringency of licensing
requirements).
131. See id. at 220–21 (comparing the average EMT training requirements
for all fifty-one jurisdictions: thirty-three days, with average cosmetologist
training requirements: 372 days and concluding that “a budding cosmetologist
needs to complete more than 11 times the education and training necessary to
serve as an EMT”).
132. See id. at 222 (“Any state that makes it more difficult to become a
cosmetologist than an EMT has clearly acted with something other than the
public welfare in mind.”).
133. See infra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing occupational
associations’ interest in becoming regulated professions and the associated
benefits).
134. See infra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing how occupations
become licensed).
135. See Frequently Asked Questions: Board for Barbers and Cosmetology,
DEP’T PROF. & OCCUPATIONAL REG., http://www.dpor.virginia.gov/Boards/
BarberCosmo/#forms-barber1 (last visited Feb. 28, 2016) (noting that
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health than a bad haircut. 136 The wide discrepancies among
states between which professions are licensed and their
corresponding training requirements raises the question of
whether certain licensing restrictions are even necessary. 137 The
number of occupations subject to licensing, as well as the
variations in state licensing laws, makes it difficult for members
of licensed professions to move between states. 138
4. Regulatory Capture and Public Choice: Why the Political
System Fails
State legislatures enact the laws that create licensing boards
and that require various occupations to obtain licenses. 139
Although bringing these problems to a local legislator may seem

electrologists are an unregulated profession) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); see generally Memorandum from Louise Fontaine Ware, Dir.
Dep’t Prof’l & Occupational Regulation, to Mark Warner, Governor of the
Commonwealth of Va., Bruce F. Jamerson, Clerk, House of Delegates & Susan
Clarke Schaar, Clerk, Senate of Va. (Nov. 27, 2002) (reporting on the need to
regulate electrologists) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
136. See Electrolysis for Hair Removal, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/
beauty/hair-removal/cosmetic-procedures-electrolysis (last updated Nov. 20,
2012) (last visited Feb. 28, 2016) (noting that improperly performed electrolysis
can lead to scarring) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Electrolysis destroys the “growth center of hair with heat or chemical energy” by
inserting a probe into the hair follicle and then removing the follicle with
tweezers. See id. (describing the electrolysis procedure).
137. See SUMMERS, supra note 34, at 6 (discussing the wide disparity
between the numbers of licensed job categories among the various states and
arguing that it is difficult to justify the disparity); see also CARPENTER, supra
note 26, at 16–17 (comparing 102 licensed professions across all fifty-one
jurisdictions and noting significant differences in licensing).
138. See OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK, supra note 28, at 39
(noting that the difference in interstate moves between licensed and unlicensed
workers indicates that licensing is a barrier to relocation). This may pose
serious challenges for military spouses, who are ten times more likely to have
moved across state lines in the preceding year. See id. at 10 (discussing
licensing and military spouses). In response to pressure from First Lady
Michelle Obama and Dr. Jill Biden, all fifty states have simplified the procedure
for military spouse license transfers. See id. (discussing changes to state policy).
139. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-702–703 (2014) (requiring a license to
practice cosmetology and establishing the Board for Barbers and Cosmetology).
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like a logical solution, challenging occupational licensing at the
legislative level is problematic for several reasons.
First, many occupations want to be licensed. 140 Licensing
allows professionals to restrict competition and control prices. 141
Self-interest often wins out over reasonable regulation. 142
Licensing boards and professionals benefit by restricting
consumers’ access to unlicensed professionals who offer the same
services at lower costs. 143 In North Carolina, for example, the
State Dental Board used its regulatory power to drive non-dentist
teeth whiteners out of business 144 after the whiteners undercut
dentists’ prices for teeth whitening. 145 Licensing boards may also
use public health as a pretext to establish regulations intended to
limit intra-professional competition. 146

140. See Larkin, supra note 22, at 227 (discussing the work of economist
George Stigler in drawing the conclusion that “[i]ncumbent business support
licensing requirements because licensing protects incumbents against
competition”).
141. See Simon, supra note 120 (quoting Morris Kleiner’s statement that
“occupations prefer to be licensed because they can restrict competition and
obtain higher wages”); CARPENTER, supra note 26, at 29 (“Occupational
practitioners, often through professional associations, use the power of
concentrated interests to lobby state legislators for protection from competition
through licensing laws.”); supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing the
financial benefits of occupational licensing).
142. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 2013)
(explaining that “licensure requirements and other restrictions imposed on
prospective casket retailers create funeral industry control over intrastate
casket sales”).
143. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 25, at 1113–14 (noting the increase in
prices due to occupational licensing).
144. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 717 F.3d
359, 364 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the Board issued cease-and-desist
letters to non-dentist whitening practices and engaged in other actions that
“successfully expelled non-dentist providers from the North Carolina teethwhitening market”).
145. See id. at 365 (noting that non-dentists offered whitening services at
“significantly lower price[s] than dentists,” causing dentists to complain to the
Board).
146. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 25, at 1107 (explaining that one strategy
dental licensing boards use in anticompetitive conduct is to restrict the number
of hygienists a dentist can hire because “dentist-to-hygienist ratios tend to raise
prices but not quality”).
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Second, occupational licensing is a prime example of public
choice theory. 147 This theory assumes that officials do not
abandon self-interest upon election, but will instead engage in
whatever conduct is necessary to remain in office. 148 Licensing
boards exercise powerful influence over elected officials by
providing campaign funding and support. 149 In exchange for that
support, private organizations that lobby to either become
regulated professions 150 or to set licensing regulations
commensurate with organizational membership standards 151 are
often successful. 152 Even if multiple small groups of aspiring
practitioners lobby for change, it is unlikely that they could
defeat a powerful and entrenched licensing scheme. 153 Concerns
about public choice and regulatory capture are particularly

147. See Kleiner, supra note 13, at 33 (noting that financial contributions to
Minnesota legislature members from industries with interest in occupational
regulations are “consistent with capture theory”); Larkin, supra note 22, at 229
(explaining that, under public choice theory, legislators engage in “rent
extraction” and “obtain the continued support of regulated entities by
threatening them with new legislation”).
148. See Larkin, supra note 22, at 228–34 (discussing public choice theory
and explaining its relevance to elected officials).
149. See KLEINER, supra note 91, at 35 (“[I]ndustries that are most impacted
by occupational licensing are more likely to contribute to influential individuals
in the legislature. Funding for legislative leaders followed the occupational
groups with the most at stake in the regulatory process.”).
150. See id. at 30–31 (“[L]icensing appears to be responsive to political
pressure from occupational associations seeking to become regulated.”).
151. See Clark M. Neily III, Coaxing the Courts Back to Their Truth-Seeking
Role in Economic Liberty Cases, in ECONOMIC LIBERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION:
AN INTRODUCTION, HERITAGE FOUND. SPECIAL REPORT 25, 27 (Paul J. Larkin, Jr.
ed., 2014) (noting that the American Society for Interior Design (ASID) has
lobbied extensively to establish license requirements for interior designers that
happen to correspond with the qualifications for ASID membership and include
expensive exams administered by private companies affiliated with ASID).
152. See Larkin, supra note 22, at 229 (“Interest groups will trade political
rents in the form of votes, campaign contributions, paid speaking engagements,
book purchases, and get-out-the-vote efforts in return for the economic rents
that cartel-creating or -reinforcing regulations, such as occupational licensing,
can provide.”).
153. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2013)
(noting that the Abbey petitioned the legislature twice to allow non-profit
charities to sell caskets, but the bills never made it past the committee stage).
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relevant in analyzing the split between the Fifth, Sixth, and
Tenth Circuits over casket sales and economic protection.
C. The Circuit Split: Casket Sales, Licenses, and Legitimate
Interests
Over the last decade, a split has developed between the Fifth,
Sixth, and Tenth Circuits over whether pure economic
protectionism is a legitimate government interest for establishing
a state occupational licensing scheme. 154 Plaintiffs in each of
these cases claimed that state occupational licensing statutes
that restricted the right to sell caskets to licensed funeral
directors operating out of licensed funeral homes violated the Due
Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 155
1. Craigmiles v. Giles
In Craigmiles v. Giles, 156 Craigmiles operated two casket
stores but did not embalm bodies or conduct funeral services. 157
154. Compare St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 222–23 (concluding that
economic protection alone is not a legitimate purpose, but an additional public
purpose can support protectionist legislation), and Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d
220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that legislation designed to protect a specific
interest group from economic competition does not serve a legitimate
government purpose), with Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1220 (10th Cir.
2004) (concluding that favoring one intrastate industry is a legitimate state
interest, provided the favoritism does not violate federal law or the
Constitution).
155. See, e.g., St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 220 (“The complaint asserted
that the licensure requirements . . . [deny] the Abbey and Coudrain equal
protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because they bear
no rational relationship to any valid governmental interest.”); Powers, 379 F.3d
at 1213 (noting that plaintiffs claimed the law “violates the Privileges and
Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment”); Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 223 (listing plaintiff’s claims that the
statute violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses).
156. 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
157. See id. at 222–23 (“Craigmiles and his fellow plaintiffs operate two
independent casket stores. . . . The stores offer caskets, urns, grave markers,
monuments, flower holders, and other merchandise items. The stores engage in
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The Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act 158 (FDEA)
requires anyone engaging in “funeral directing” to be licensed by
the Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers. 159 A 1972
amendment to the FDEA had modified the definition of funeral
directing to include sales of funeral merchandise. 160 The Board
issued a cease-and-desist to Craigmiles, claiming that by selling
caskets, he was engaging in funeral directing, thereby violating
the FDEA. 161 Craigmiles sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming
violations of the Due Process, Equal Protection and Privileges
and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 162
Writing for the Sixth Circuit, Judge Boggs applied rational
basis review and concluded that “protecting a discrete interest
group from economic competition is not a legitimate
governmental purpose.” 163 He found that the real purpose
behind the licensing restriction was to protect the funeral
industry from competition, 164 and that the FDEA violated the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. 165 Judge Boggs
individually tackled and rejected each of Tennessee’s
justifications for the law: protecting consumer health and
no embalming or arranging of funeral services, cremations, or burials.”).
158. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-101 (West 2014).
159. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222 (describing the FDEA’s licensing
requirements). The FDEA has strict licensing requirements; applicants must
“complete either one year of course work at an accredited mortuary school and
then a one-year apprenticeship with a licensed funeral director or a two-year
apprenticeship.” Id. Candidates must also pass an exam that only peripherally
addresses funeral merchandising and caskets. Id.
160. See id. (explaining the 1972 amendment).
161. See id. at 223 (describing the Board’s actions against the plaintiffs’
businesses).
162. See id. (explaining Craigmiles’s claims that the FDEA violated the Due
Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
163. Id. at 224.
164. See id. at 228–29 (finding that the “licensure requirement imposes a
significant barrier to competition in the casket market” and “protect[s] licensed
funeral directors from competition” but fails to provide consumer protection).
The court found that the regulations actually harmed consumers. Id.
165. See id. at 222 (affirming that the FDEA violates the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses). Plaintiffs’ Privileges and Immunities claim did not
survive. See id. at 223 (noting that the district court rejected the claim).
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safety, 166 protecting consumers, 167 applying the Federal Trade
Commission’s “Funeral Rule,” 168 and helping grieving
customers. 169 The court argued that each of these claims was a
pretextual excuse that did not have a rational relationship to the
law. 170 Craigmiles applied an enhanced form of rational basis
review by providing an in-depth analysis of the law’s
justifications and the legislature’s motives. 171 The opinion
emphasized that it had not embraced Lochner 172 but had
“invalidat[ed] only the General Assembly’s attempts to raise a

166. See id. at 225 (noting that plaintiffs only delivered purchased caskets
to funeral homes and did not provide embalming services). Although the court
identified casket quality as a reasonable concern, Tennessee law “does not
require that any particular type of casket, or any casket at all, be used at
burial.” Id.
167. See id. (noting that criminal and civil sanctions already applied to
retailer misconduct and that casket retailers would not be “free to ‘engage in
misrepresentation and fraud’ if not covered by the FDEA”).
168. See id. at 227–28 (finding that the Funeral Rule applied even without
the FDEA, that the rule was irrelevant for casket retailers, and that the
legislature could have required retailer compliance without licensing). The
Funeral Rule defines “funeral providers” and requires that they disclose prices
of goods and services as well as avoid deceptive acts or practices as defined by
the Rule. See 16 C.F.R. § 453 (2013) (detailing provisions of the Funeral Rule).
169. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 228 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the
claim that unlicensed casket retailers will aggravate the survivors’ grief because
“survivors must deal with a panoply of vendors in order to make funeral
arrangements . . . none of whom is required to have [psychological] training”).
170. See id. at 225 (“The weakness of Tennessee’s proffered explanations
indicates that the 1972 amendment adding the retail sale of funeral
merchandise to the definition of funeral directing was nothing more than an
attempt to prevent economic competition.”).
171. See id. at 228–29 (“Finding no rational relationship to any of the
articulated purposes of the state, we are left with the more obvious illegitimate
purpose. . . . If consumer protection were the aim of the 1972 amendment, the
General Assembly had several direct means of achieving that end.”). But see
Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1217 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that
“rational basis review does not give courts the option to speculate as to whether
some other scheme could have better regulated the evils in question” and that
motivation is irrelevant because the legislature is not obligated to explain why it
enacted a statute).
172. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 229 (explaining that the decision “is not a
return to Lochner”).
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fortress protecting the monopoly rents that funeral directors
extract from consumers.” 173
2. Powers v. Harris
The circumstances in Powers v. Harris 174 were similar to
Craigmiles—namely that a state statute restricted the right to
sell caskets and other funeral merchandise to licensed funeral
directors operating out of licensed funeral homes. 175 Unlike the
Sixth Circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
found that the Oklahoma Funeral Services Licensing Act 176
(FLSA) did not violate the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. 177
Applying rational basis review, Judge Tacha held that
legislation designed to protect a particular industry from
competition was a legitimate state interest, as long as it did not
violate the Constitution or federal law. 178 Although the FLSA’s
requirements did not correspond to the state’s claimed goal of
consumer protection, the law was valid because the court
identified another plausible legitimate state interest: protecting
the funeral industry from competition. 179
The plaintiffs had cited Craigmiles as favorable precedent,
but Judge Tacha disagreed with Craigmiles on three points. 180
First, Craigmiles paid too much attention to the legislature’s
173. Id.
174. 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004).
175. See id. at 1211 (explaining the FSLA’s restrictions).
176. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 395.1 (2014).
177. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1225 (10th Cir. 2004) (concluding
that economic protectionism of an intrastate industry is a “legitimate state
interest and the FLSA is rationally related to this legitimate end”).
178. See id. at 1221 (“[A]bsent a violation of a specific constitutional
provision or other federal law, intrastate economic protectionism constitutes a
legitimate state interest.”).
179. See id. at 1216–17 (explaining that the “decision of the legislature must
be upheld if ‘any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be
assumed affords support for it’” (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938))).
180. See id. at 1223 (explaining how the holding diverges from Craigmiles).
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motives. 181 Second, the opinion incorrectly concluded that
economic protection is not a legitimate government purpose. 182
Finally, Craigmiles based its decision on precedent that applied
second-order rational basis review. 183 Judge Tacha argued that by
relying on improper precedent, Craigmiles incorrectly applied
rational basis review and reached the wrong result. 184
In a concurring opinion, Judge Tymkovich argued that
protectionist legislation, although valid, has always required an
accompanying “non-protectionist public good.” 185 He found that
Oklahoma had satisfied its burden because the licensing scheme
reached consumer protection goals, however imperfectly. 186 Even
though the scheme actually appeared to harm consumers, Judge
Tymkovich thought the legislature should resolve the
inconsistency, rather than the court. 187
181. See id. (noting that the Craigmiles court improperly focused on “the
court’s perception of the actual motives of the Tennessee legislature”).
182. See id. at 1220 (claiming that the Supreme Court has consistently
found that protecting intrastate industries, absent a specific violation of federal
statutes or the Constitution, is a “legitimate state interest” (citing Fitzgerald v.
Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 109 (2003))).
183. See id. at 1223–24 (criticizing Craigmiles’s reliance on Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. and explaining that even if the court agreed that
“laws discriminating against historically unpopular groups” required a stricter
form of rational basis review, the plaintiffs do not fall within that category).
Second-order rational basis review is a variation of rational basis review that is
less deferential to legislative determinations and applies greater scrutiny to the
legislators’ motives. See Florman, supra note 89, at 745 (describing second-order
rational basis review). See infra Part IV.B (discussing second-order rational
basis review).
184. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1223 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining
that in applying Cleburne, Craigmiles departed from “traditional” rational basis
review because it analyzed the legislature’s motives and failed to identify other
“conceivable legitimate state interest[s] on behalf of the challenged statute”).
185. See id. at 1226 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (explaining that the
Supreme Court has always “insisted that the legislation advance some public
good” (referencing Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955);
Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103 (2003); City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505
U.S. 1 (1992))).
186. See id. (noting that the licensing scheme “provides a legal club to attack
sharp practices by a major segment of casket retailers”).
187. See id. (observing that although consumers are harmed by limits on
price and choice in the statute, that problem should be addressed by the
legislature in its role as the “ultimate arbiter of state policy”).
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3. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille
More recently, the Fifth Circuit sided with Craigmiles in
another casket sale dispute, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille. 188 The
monks of St. Joseph Abbey sought to sell wooden coffins, but the
Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors
blocked their efforts. 189 As in Powers and Craigmiles, a state
statute restricted the right to sell caskets to licensed funeral
directors. 190 The Abbey filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 191
Writing for the majority, Judge Higginbotham acknowledged
that economic protection is a legitimate purpose—provided it is
supported by an additional public good. 192 He explained that the
Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Greater Houston Small Taxicab
Company Owners Association v. City of Houston 193 upheld taxicab
permit requirements favoring larger companies because there
was a “legitimate interest” in addition to protecting large taxi
companies from competition. 194 To sustain the statute, the court
had to find that the law was rationally related to consumer
protection. 195
188. 712 F.3d 215, 222–23 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing the difference between
Powers and the Craigmiles court and ultimately siding with Craigmiles in
determining that “mere economic protection” is not a legitimate purpose).
189. See supra notes 2–12 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of St.
Joseph Abbey).
190. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing state law
restrictions on casket sales).
191. See St. Joseph, 712 F.3d at 220 (describing the complaint).
192. See id. at 222–23 (“[N]either precedent nor broader principles suggest
that mere economic protection of a particular industry is a legitimate
government purpose, but economic protection, that is favoritism, may well be
perceived by a post hoc perceived rationale . . . without which it is aptly
described as a naked transfer of wealth.”).
193. 660 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 2011).
194. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 2013)
(explaining that even if protectionism was one goal of taxi permit requirements,
it was clear that “promoting full-service taxi operations is a legitimate
government purpose under the rational basis test” (quoting Greater Hous. Small
Taxicab Co. Owners Ass’n v. City of Houston, 660 F.3d 235, 240 (5th Cir.
2011))).
195. See id. (“[T]he State Board cannot escape the pivotal inquiry of whether
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Judge Higginbotham reviewed and rejected the Board’s claim
that the law protected consumers because the licensure
requirements secured funeral industry control over intrastate
casket sales; 196 Louisiana does not require a casket for burial,
therefore consumers do not need information about caskets; 197
consumers must already pay a service fee for assistance with
funeral preparations that can include advice about caskets; 198 and
Louisiana’s consumer-protection laws apply to casket vendors. 199
Due to these factors, it was clear that “no rational relationship
exists between public health and safety and restricting intrastate
casket sales to funeral directors.” 200
Judge Higgenbotham explained that Powers relied on
precedent that found that protectionism is not an “illegitimate
interest” when it is tied to a public welfare goal. 201 From there,
Powers had improperly concluded that protectionism alone was a
legitimate interest. 202 In finding for the Abbey, the Fifth Circuit
engaged in a heightened review similar to Craigmiles; both courts
there is such a rational basis . . . that can now be articulated and is not plainly
refuted by the Abbey. . . . [and that the] challenged restrictions are rationally
related to protection of public health, safety, and consumer welfare.”).
196. See id. at 223–24 (explaining that based on the definitions of “funeral
establishment” and “funeral directing,” casket retailers are forced to meet all
the statutory requirements for a funeral establishment and director, ensuring
that the funeral industry controls intrastate casket sales).
197. See id. at 224 (explaining that a funeral director’s expertise relating to
caskets is “irrelevant” because Louisiana does not have statutory requirements
related to casket use or quality).
198. See id. at 225 (explaining that customers are required to pay a
mandatory service fee for a funeral director to assist the customer with funeral
logistics, regardless of where the customer purchases a casket; because only
funeral directors can dispose of bodies, the customer always receives this
assistance).
199. See id. (“Louisiana’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Law already polices inappropriate sales tactics by all sellers of caskets.”).
200. Id. at 226.
201. See id. at 222 (noting that Powers relied on precedent “indicat[ing] that
protecting or favoring a particular intrastate industry is not an illegitimate
interest when protection of the industry can be linked to advancement of the
public interest or general welfare”).
202. See id. (explaining that none of the cases cited by the Powers court
actually support the proposition that intrastate economic protectionism alone is
a legitimate interest).
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carefully reviewed and rejected the state’s rationales. 203 This
directly
contradicted
both
Powers’s
conclusion
and
methodology. 204
4. Legitimate Interests and Rational Basis Review
The circuit split raises two issues for analysis. First, the
circuits disagree as to whether licensing restrictions intended
solely to protect an intrastate industry from competition are a
legitimate state interest that satisfies the rational basis review
requirement. 205
Second, the circuits have differing perspectives about the
appropriate scope of rational basis review. 206 Although St. Joseph
and Craigmiles insisted that they were not resurrecting
Lochnerian principles, 207 they arguably engaged in a slightly
enhanced form of rational basis review. 208 Powers followed a more
203. See supra notes 167–169 (discussing Craigmiles’s analysis of the
FDEA).
204. See supra notes 181–184 and accompanying text (discussing Powers’s
disagreement with Craigmiles).
205. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit split).
The Ninth Circuit has also considered the issue in Merrifield v. Lockyer, when it
found that a California statute that required non-pesticide using pest
controllers ordinarily exempt from licensing requirements to obtain a license for
dealing with the most common vertebrate pests (mice, rats, and pigeons)
violated the Equal Protection Clause. See Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978,
991–92 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that “singling out” the specific pests violated
the Equal Protection Clause because it provided economic favoritism for “certain
constituents at the expense of others similarly situated”). The Ninth Circuit
concluded that economic protectionism alone is not a sufficient basis to
determine if a legislative classification survives rational basis review. See id. at
991 n.15 (“[E]conomic protectionism for its own sake, regardless of its relation to
the common good, cannot be said to be in furtherance of a legitimate interest.”).
206. See supra notes 183–184 and accompanying text (noting the Tenth
Circuit’s criticism of the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on precedents that applied a
higher standard of review).
207. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing the Craigmiles
court’s insistence that it was not reviving Lochner); see also St. Joseph Abbey v.
Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 227 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Nor is the ghost of Lochner lurking
about. . . . We insist only that Louisiana’s regulation not be irrational.”).
208. See Florman, supra note 89, at 749–51 (2012) (arguing that the Fifth
Circuit applied “rational basis with bite” in St. Joseph Abbey because the court
utilized a “means-end” analysis); see supra notes 183–184 (discussing the Tenth
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traditional format; 209 instead of reviewing a list of rationales
offered by the state, the court fulfilled its obligation under
rational basis and independently identified a reason to uphold
the statute. 210
The Supreme Court has declined to weigh in on whether
economic protectionism is a legitimate state interest. 211 No
majority opinion has ever provided specific criteria to determine
what constitutes a legitimate state interest. 212 The Court has also
recently refused an opportunity to reevaluate whether the
existing formulation of rational basis review serves its intended
purpose. 213 Due to confusion among the circuits over these issues,
Circuit’s disagreement with Craigmiles’s application of rational basis review).
209. See Florman, supra note 89, at 734 (explaining that unlike in
Craigmiles, the Powers court did not “examine the nature of the relationship
between the occupational licensing statute and public health, consumer
protection, or any other legitimate state interest traditionally used to uphold a
law under rational basis review”).
210. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1217 (10th Cir. 2004) (“In fact,
‘this Court is obligated to seek out other conceivable reasons for validating [a
state statute.]’” (quoting Starlight Sugar, Inc. v. Soto, 253 F.3d 137, 146 (1st Cir.
2001))).
211. See Sandefur, supra note 89, at 1025 (noting that the Supreme Court
has chosen not to weigh in on the split between the Sixth and Tenth Circuits,
leading to confusion).
212. See Nollan v. Cal. Costal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834–35 (1987) (“Our
cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a
‘legitimate state interest’. . . . They have made clear, however, that a broad
range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfies these requirements.”);
see also SANDEFUR, supra note 74, at 129 (“[A]lthough the rational basis test has
been the law of the land for 70 years, courts have yet to articulate what,
precisely, is a legitimate state interest.”).
213. See Brief for Petitioner at I, Heffner v. Murphy, 135 S. Ct. 220 (No. 1453) (2014) (presenting the question of whether, in applying rational basis
review, a court should “evaluate the rationality of enforcing a challenged law
under the factual circumstances of the world today” or whether the court should
consider rationality at the time the law was enacted, regardless of changed
circumstances). The Court denied certiorari. 745 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014), cert.
denied 135 S. Ct. 220 (Oct. 6, 2014). Interestingly, the Court itself has engaged
in fact-based determinations relating to changed circumstances when analyzing
a law’s continuing applications. See Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 133 S.
Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013) (finding § 4 of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional
based on current conditions, rather than “40 year-old facts having no logical
relation to the present day”). Although Heffner might have invalidated some
outdated licensing laws, it would not have made a significant impact on the
problem of occupational licensing.
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the Court should reconsider whether rational basis review is
appropriate for evaluating occupational licensing statutes and
instead apply a heightened level of scrutiny.
IV. Rethinking Rational Basis Review
A. Rational Basis Review: A License for Political Favoritism
The primary problem with rational basis review when
applied to occupational licensing is its excessive deference; a
court can find virtually anything to be a legitimate state
interest. 214 It is very unusual for a statute to fail traditional
rational basis review. 215 Craigmiles and St. Joseph are in the
minority, and, in both cases, the courts really applied an
enhanced form of rational basis review. 216
Excessive judicial deference makes it more likely that courts
will uphold legislation that caters to interest groups at the
consumer’s expense. 217 Powers v. Harris highlighted the
problem—the Tenth Circuit essentially held that cronyism is a
legitimate state interest. 218 Rational basis review’s leniency
214. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 323 n.3 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted) (“In my view, this formulation sweeps too broadly,
for it is difficult to imagine a legislative classification that could not be
supported by a ‘reasonably conceivable state of facts.’ Judicial review under the
‘conceivable set of facts’ test is tantamount to no review at all.”).
215. See SANDEFUR, supra note 74, at 138 (explaining that courts so rarely
find laws unconstitutional under rational basis review that some commentators
suggest that judges who do overturn statutes under rational basis review are
applying a different test—“rational basis with bite”).
216. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (noting that in both cases,
the circuits applied a more searching form of rational basis review).
217. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 696–97 (1888) (Field, J.,
dissenting)
If the courts could not in such cases examine into the real character of
the act, but must accept the declaration of the legislature as
conclusive, the valued right of the citizen would be subject to the
arbitrary control of the temporary majority of such bodies, instead of
being protected by the guarantees of the Constitution.
218. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hile
baseball may be the national pastime of the citizenry, dishing out special
economic benefits to certain in-state industries remains the favored pastime of
state and local governments.”).
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allows states to prioritize a small minority over the good of all of
its citizens. 219 This is particularly troubling as the individuals
most harmed by occupational licensing have limited means and
lack ready access to legal or political assistance. 220 It is easy to
incentivize legislators to create and support protectionist
legislation because of the power that licensing organizations and
professional associations can exercise on their behalf. 221
Granting a state legislature wide discretion paired with
extremely permissive judicial scrutiny reverses from the Lochner
extreme to a situation in which legislative decisions that create a
tangible impact on citizens’ daily lives are virtually
unreviewable. 222 Occupational regulation is further removed from
judicial review because education and training requirements, as
well as licensing fees, are promulgated by state licensing boards
on legislative authorization. 223 When defending occupational
licensing, at a minimum, the state should be required to provide
justification for the law rather than forcing the court to shoulder
the burden. 224 Carolene Products was correctly concerned over the
lack of deference to the legislature, but the “overreaction to some
219. See Florman, supra note 89, at 735 (noting that occupational licensing
is “necessarily rationally related to protecting the economic interests of one
group”).
220. See supra notes 107–115 and accompanying text (discussing economic
harms associated with licensing and its impact on vulnerable individuals); see
also OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK, supra note 28, at 35–39
(discussing the increased burdens occupational licensing places on individuals
with criminal records and immigrants).
221. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing the system of
economic rents designed to keep legislators in office and licensing control in the
hands of the boards).
222. See Florman, supra note 89, at 735 (concluding that under decisions
similar to Powers, all occupational licensing laws would be rational, creating an
especially problematic result should the Supreme Court ultimately favor the
Tenth Circuit’s approach).
223. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-706 (2014) (“The Board shall have the
discretion to impose different requirements for licensure for the practice of
barbering, cosmetology, nail care, waxing, tattooing, body-piercing, and
esthetics.”).
224. See SANDEFUR, supra note 74, at 130–31 (arguing that the rational
basis test places an unfair burden on the plaintiff to “imagine every possible
rationale supporting the law and prove that each is unfounded,” while granting
the court the freedom to create its own “speculative rationalizations”).
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substantive due process decisions has unfortunately eliminated
an important check in the government of checks and balances.” 225
1. Legitimate State Interests
Although the rationality of the state’s conduct is important,
the central inquiry of rational basis review addresses the
conduct’s relationship to a legitimate interest. 226 The Court has
found a number of state interests to be legitimate 227 but has
provided limited guidance as to how it reached those
conclusions. 228 Although the Justices are properly reluctant to set
state policy, 229 providing rudimentary guidelines to assist lower
courts in identifying legitimate state interests could help curb the
worst abuses. Furthermore, failure to provide guidelines grants
judges license to create rationales for the legislature, which is at
best fiction, and at worst judicial overreach. 230
225. SIEGAN, supra note 59, at 155.
226. See Sandefur, supra note 89, at 1044 (explaining that any analysis of
legislative goals always reaches the same central inquiry: “What is a legitimate,
or compelling, government interest?”).
227. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 109
(2003) (finding that incentives to promote economic development for river
communities or promoting riverboat gambling businesses are rational objectives
to support legislation that taxed riverboat slot machine revenues at a lower rate
than racetrack slot machines); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 35 (1992)
(finding that “it is beyond question that ‘inhibiting the displacement of lower
income families by the forces of gentrification,’ is a legitimate state interest”
(citations omitted)); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304–05 (1976)
(per curiam) (determining that legislation grandfathering in some pushcart
vendors satisfied a legitimate government interest in preserving the “charm and
beauty of a historic area,” promoting the tourist industry, and protecting the
“economic vitality of that area”).
228. See SANDEFUR, supra note 74, at 133 (“In some cases the Court has
suggested that the ‘legitimacy’ of a government interest can be judged simply by
the amount of support the legislative interest has.”); see also supra note 212 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court’s failure to define a “legitimate”
government interest or provide guidelines).
229. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546
(1985) (explaining that it is improper to allow an “unelected federal judiciary to
make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes”).
230. See supra note 210 (discussing a court’s obligation under rational basis
review); see also SANDEFUR, supra note 74, at 131 (“[T]he rational basis test
allows judges to devise their own, entirely speculative rationalizations for a
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Justice Stevens provided a reasonable set of flexible
guidelines in a dissenting opinion:
A legitimate state interest must encompass the interests of
members of the disadvantaged class and the community at
large as well as the direct interests of the members of the
favored class. It must have a purpose or goal independent of
the direct effect of the legislation and one “that we may
reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial
legislature.” 231

The “impartial legislature” requirement directly addresses
concerns relating to public choice theory, 232 and applying this
standard would resolve the circuit split. 233 Under Justice
Stevens’s formulation, legislation designed to insulate an
intrastate industry from competition would require an additional
public interest element to qualify as a legitimate state interest. 234
The “public good” requirement is logically related to occupational
licensing’s roots in state police powers to protect public health
and safety. 235 Should the Court choose not to increase the level of
scrutiny applied to occupational licensing statutes, at the least it
challenged law, even reasons not offered in the legislature or in court.”).
231. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 34 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452 n.4 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
232. See supra Part III.B.4 (discussing occupational licensing and public
choice theory).
233. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the split between
the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits over whether pure economic protectionism
is a legitimate state interest).
234. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 222–23 (5th Cir. 2013)
(explaining that protectionist legislation that also provides a public benefit is a
legitimate interest); see also Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n, 539 U.S. 103, 109 (2003)
(noting potential state interests beyond providing financial assistance to
riverboat operators, including promoting economic development for river
communities, riverboat history, or “reliance interests” based on the previous tax
rate); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 305 (1976) (per curiam)
(finding an interest in preserving the historic nature of the French Quarter and
enhancing the tourist economy, even though the legislation benefitted certain
pushcart vendors over others).
235. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (noting that licensing
restrictions must be rationally related to an individual’s fitness to practice); see
infra note 310 and accompanying text (discussing occupational licensing’s
relationship to the police power).
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should require the state to justify its reason for regulation and
require that protectionist legislation bear a direct relationship to
public welfare.
B. Strict Scrutiny: An Unlikely Alternative
Strict scrutiny originated in Footnote Four of Carolene
Products. 236 It applies when government action potentially
infringes on a fundamental right. 237 Fundamental rights must be
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” and the
Court requires a “careful description” of the interest. 238 Strict
scrutiny requires a two-part analysis. First, the court must
determine if the government has a compelling interest. 239 If so,
then the court determines whether the scope of the law is
sufficiently narrow to meet those ends. 240
Under an originalist interpretation, property rights are
fundamental rights and deserve strict scrutiny. 241 The Court,
however, has never included property rights in its jurisprudence
identifying fundamental rights. 242 It is extremely unlikely that
236. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800
(2006) (“For laws touching on fundamental rights or discriminating against
racial minorities, Carolene Products suggested the possibility of a more vigorous
judicial role—a ‘more searching judicial scrutiny.’”).
237. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (explaining that due
process “forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty
interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”).
238. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (describing the
process for identifying fundamental rights).
239. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (explaining
that restrictions that “curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect” and deserve “rigid scrutiny”).
240. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718
(1981) (explaining that the state may justify limitations on religious freedom “by
showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state
interest”).
241. See Barnett, supra note 53, at 11–12 (arguing that the Constitution
protects economic rights, even if the Supreme Court has chosen not to enforce
those protections).
242. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (listing fundamental rights identified
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the Court would return to using economic due process as set forth
in Lochner. 243 Lower courts are reluctant to take such a step 244 (or
indeed, to even appear to be taking that step) and commentators
consider it far-fetched. 245 Returning to Lochner would undermine
laws designed to protect workers. 246 Lochner Era decisions
rejected minimum wage laws 247 and attacked unions, 248 both of
which protect individual workers who lack equal bargaining
power. 249
in Supreme Court precedent, including the right to marry, have children,
abortion, contraceptive use, bodily integrity, and privacy within marriage, but
not the right to pursue a “common calling”).
243. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–82 (1965) (rejecting
arguments suggesting that the Court should be guided by Lochner and
explaining that “[w]e do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom,
need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems”).
244. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (noting that both the courts
in Craigmiles and St. Joseph Abbey were emphatic that they were not
backsliding to Lochner).
245. See Florman, supra note 89, at 743 (arguing that the Court is unlikely
to find that the right to earn a living is a fundamental right and therefore
subject to strict scrutiny).
246. See Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship:
Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 790–91
(2003) (noting that Lochner impeded “social citizenship” and accompanying
protections, such as “basic income security, education, health care, and
housing”). The minimum wage is one such example. The minimum wage peaked
in the 1960s and has since lost purchasing power. See Drew Desilver, 5 Facts
4,
2013),
About
the
Minimum
Wage,
PEW RES. CTR. (Dec.
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/12/04/5-facts-about-the-minimumwage/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2016) (“Adjusted for inflation, the federal minimum
wage peaked in 1968 at $8.56 (in 2012 dollars). Since it was last raised in
2009 . . . the federal minimum wage has lost about 5.8% of its purchasing power
to inflation.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Given that a
significant number of Americans work in the lowest-income jobs, invalidating
the minimum wage would have major repercussions for the economy. See id.
(explaining that 17.8% of all wage or salary workers in the United States
worked in the lowest-paid jobs in 2011).
247. See Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561–62 (1923) (overruling
a District of Columbia statute establishing a minimum wage for women).
248. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (overturning
Adair’s conviction under § 10 of the Erdman Act for firing unionized employees
as “arbitrarily sanction[ing] an illegal invasion of the personal liberty as well as
the right of property of the defendant Adair”).
249. See LAWRENCE MISHEL & MATTHEW WALTERS, ECON. POL’Y INST.: HOW
UNIONS HELP ALL WORKERS, BRIEFING PAPER 143, at 4–5 (Aug. 26, 2003),
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The Court is deeply entrenched in a policy of legislative
deference. 250 Unbridled economic legislation without judicial
oversight arguably leads to political favoritism and legislation
that protects industries at the taxpayer’s expense. 251 But strict
scrutiny allowed the judiciary to improperly substitute its policy
preferences for the legislative will of the majority. 252 Therefore,
strict scrutiny is no solution at all. It merely trades one problem
for another.
C. Second-Order Rational Basis: A Weak Compromise
Some commentators and scholars have argued that
“second-order rational basis review,” or “rational basis with
teeth,” is an appropriate standard for evaluating licensing

http://s4.epi.org/files/page/-/old/briefingpapers/143/bp143.pdf (noting the positive
impact that union involvement has on wage growth for low- and middle-income
workers); Robert E. Prasch & Falguni A. Sheth, The Economics and Ethics of
Minimum Wage Legislation, 57 REV. SOC. ECON. 466, 472 (1999) (arguing that a
higher minimum wage provides significant assistance to workers who lack
bargaining power). Workers in “low-wage markets” are often stuck working in
low-paying jobs because of their lack of education and inability to finance a
search for better employment. See id. (discussing the plight of low-wage
workers).
250. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(“When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause
allows the States wide latitude . . . and the Constitution presumes that even
improvident decisions will be rectified by the democratic process.”); see also
supra note 87 and accompanying text (noting the deference accorded to
legislative decisions on economic policy).
251. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Economic Liberty and the Constitution: An
Introduction, in ECONOMIC LIBERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 151, at 1,
6 (arguing that the Court may reconsider its precedents after examining “the
economic and political reality underlying exclusionary licensing cases” because
those precedents grant “politically powerful groups” the ability to make
economic decisions that are harmful to poorer and less powerful individuals).
252. See COX, supra note 58, at 135
The Lochnerian decisions are often characterized as ‘activist.’ Plainly
the Justices in the majority did not hesitate to substitute judicial
opinions for the judgments of elected representatives of the
people. . . . The term ‘activist’ is also fairly applicable . . . insofar as it
implies a self-conscious will to reach a social or political result, giving
scant weight to recognized sources of law.
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restrictions. 253 Second-order rational basis review applies when a
law is aimed at a “politically unpopular group” and is more likely
to be applied to laws impacting personal relationships than to
other situations. 254 For example, the Court applied second-order
rational basis in Lawrence v. Texas 255 when it struck down a
Texas law criminalizing same-sex sexual relations. 256
Second-order rational basis is characterized by reduced deference
to legislative determinations and enhanced scrutiny of the
legislature’s motivations for passing the law. 257 It is presented as
a viable solution because the inquiry requires the court to first
determine that the licensing scheme is suspect and then confirm
those suspicions by determining whether the state’s justifications
are pretextual. 258
Second-order rational basis, however, is a watered-down
version of intermediate scrutiny. 259 It is not particularly clear
when it should apply, or what the permissible scope of inquiry
is. 260 Applying a standard that lacks clear boundaries creates a
253. See Florman, supra note 89, at 768 (proposing that an enhanced
rational basis review is appropriate for occupational licensing challenges under
the Fourteenth Amendment); Raynor, supra note 89, at 1101 (arguing that
licensing laws should be subject to second-order rational basis tests).
254. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (explaining when the
Court is likely to apply “a more searching form of rational basis review”).
255. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
256. See id. at 578 (finding that a Texas statute criminalizing same-sex
sexual conduct did not further a legitimate state interest and that the state
could not make petitioners’ “private sexual conduct a crime”).
257. See id. at 581–83 (reviewing the state’s motivation for criminalizing
same-sex sexual relations and addressing each of the state’s contentions in
turn); see also supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing and defining
second-order rational basis review).
258. See Raynor, supra note 89, at 1100 (describing application of secondorder rational basis review).
259. See Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate
Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 801 (1987) (arguing that the
analysis under “rational basis with bite” cases is essentially the same as
intermediate scrutiny).
260. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
[B]y failing to articulate the factors that justify today’s ‘second order’
rational-basis review, the Court provides no principled foundation for
determining when a more searching inquiry is to be invoked. Lower
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significant risk of abuse, such as expanding the inquiry into
economic policies best left to the legislature. 261
Craigmiles and St. Joseph both applied a version of
second-order rational basis review, which has led to inconsistency
across the circuits. 262 Because second-order rational basis is not
clearly defined or understood, applying it to occupational
licensing statutes will only create more confusion. 263
D. Intermediate Scrutiny: An Appropriate Balance
Intermediate scrutiny refers to a standard of review that is
less stringent than strict scrutiny, but more thorough than
rational basis review. 264 Courts use four balancing characteristics
to determine whether intermediate scrutiny protects a particular
class: (1) a history of discrimination; (2) a “defining
characteristic” that relates to the ability to contribute to society;
(3) obvious and distinguishing characteristics that define the
class as a distinct group; and (4) the class is either a minority or
“politically powerless.” 265 To pass intermediate scrutiny, the
challenged legislation must serve an important government
courts are thus left in the dark . . . and this Court remains
unaccountable for its decisions employing, or refusing to employ,
particularly searching scrutiny.
261. See id. (explaining that second-order rational basis “creates precedent
for this Court and lower courts to subject economic and commercial
classifications to similar and searching ‘ordinary’ rational basis review—a small
and regrettable step back to the days of Lochner v. New York”).
262. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of
review in St. Joseph and Craigmiles and noting their deviation from traditional
rational basis review).
263. See Pettinga, supra note 259, at 802 (“Rational basis with bite,
therefore, creates a limitless opportunity for the court to closely scrutinize
legislation whenever it sees fit. This unbridled freedom. . . . fosters lower court
confusion as to what version of the rational basis test to apply in any given
case.”).
264. See Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as
Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 300 (1998) (explaining the
intermediate scrutiny standard).
265. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012)
(describing the four factors used to determine if a classification qualifies as a
suspect class).
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objective, and the means must have a substantial relationship to
achieving the government objective. 266
Courts applying intermediate scrutiny must “evaluate the
rationality of legislative judgment with reference to well-settled
constitutional principles” that address “sufficiently absolute and
enduring” constitutional concerns. 267 Under intermediate
scrutiny, a court is free to reject a state’s purported legitimate
interest. 268 If there is an alternative means of achieving the
state’s objectives without harming the protected group, a court
may require it. 269 Intermediate scrutiny has been applied to cases
dealing with classes such as gender, 270 homosexuality, 271
illegitimacy, 272 or to categories such as commercial speech273 that
do not fall into strict scrutiny’s “fundamental rights” category. 274
1. Individuals Harmed by Occupational Licensing Statutes Fall
Within Intermediate Scrutiny’s Ambit
The social and constitutional importance of a particular
interest may warrant a higher level of scrutiny in an equal
266. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)
(explaining how a discriminatory law may survive intermediate scrutiny).
267. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.16 (1982).
268. See Wengler, 446 U.S. at 152 (rejecting administrative convenience as a
legitimate state interest that allows a mandatory preference of one sex over
another).
269. See id. at 151–53 (noting that the state has the burden of showing that
the discriminatory conduct substantially serves the statutory end and that the
court may invalidate legislation to apply the alternative option).
270. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on gender).
271. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d, 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2012)
(concluding that homosexuals are part of a quasi-suspect class subject to
intermediate scrutiny).
272. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 264–65 (1978) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to classifications based on illegitimacy).
273. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980) (explaining that intermediate scrutiny applies in commercial
speech cases).
274. See supra note 242 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental
rights that are reviewed with strict scrutiny).
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protection inquiry. 275 The state is required to provide strong
justifications for laws that exclude its citizens from state
protection or assistance. 276 Arbitrary and protectionist licensing
laws deny equal protection because “[c]entral to both the rule of
law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection
is the principle that government and each of its parts remain
open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.” 277
Because many occupational licensing restrictions are arbitrary
and inimical to persons trying to enter the profession, they
deserve to be examined under heightened scrutiny. 278
The majority of individuals harmed by protectionist licensing
statutes are poor, uneducated, or minorities. 279 Although
plaintiffs challenging these statutes do not fall neatly within a
“suspect” or “quasi-suspect” classification, 280 their lack of political
and economic power makes applying intermediate scrutiny
reasonable. 281 An easily classifiable minority may be able to
275. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he level of scrutiny
employed in an equal protection case should vary with ‘the constitutional and
societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized
invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.’”
(quoting San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99
(1973) (Marshall, J. dissenting))).
276. See id. (explaining that ordinances designed to exclude mentally
retarded individuals from residential areas in a community must be justified as
“substantially furthering legitimate and important purposes”).
277. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633–34 (1996) (“‘Equal protection of the
laws
is
not
achieved
through
indiscriminate
imposition
of
inequalities’. . . . Respect for this principle explains why laws singling out a
certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status or general hardships are
rare.” (citations omitted)).
278. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221–22 (1982) (explaining that one goal
of the Equal Protection Clause is “the abolition of governmental barriers
presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual
merit”).
279. See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text (discussing the
individuals who are harmed the most by arbitrary occupational licensing
statutes).
280. See Winkler, supra note 236, at 833–34 (explaining that the majority of
suspect class discrimination cases between 1990 and 2003 dealt with racial
classifications).
281. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223–24 (noting that the suspect class
requirement is unnecessary when the law in question imposes hardship on a
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cultivate greater political capital through organization and public
sympathy, whereas isolated individuals seeking access to a
profession are more likely to be ignored. 282 Due to their
unrepresented and disorganized status, it is unlikely that
resorting to the political process would prove successful. 283 The
only existing remedy, therefore, is a judiciary that currently
utilizes a standard of review that upholds occupational licensing
laws based on legitimate state interests such as protecting
customers from pricking their fingers on a piece of wire in a
bouquet. 284
Occupational licensing is an issue of major social importance
because of its rapid expansion; these laws impact nearly
one-third of the workforce. 285 They also affect both individuals
seeking the right to practice and consumers who are harmed by
the lack of market competition. 286 Therefore, applying
intermediate scrutiny is appropriate.

group that is not accountable for its status).
282. See McCloskey, supra note 109, at 50 (“[O]ther ‘discrete’ minorities,
such as racial groups have occasionally displayed respectable capacities to exert
political leverage by virtue of their very discreteness. Not so to the isolated
economic man who belongs to no identifiable group at all.”).
283. See SANDEFUR, supra note 74, at 140 (noting that bureaucracy,
legislative rules, and administrative agencies make it “difficult for voters to
remove sitting legislators”).
284. See Meadows v. Odom, 360 F. Supp. 2d 811, 824 (M.D. La. 2005),
vacated as moot, 198 Fed. Appx. 348 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that Louisiana’s
“public safety” rationale for licensing florists was supported by evidence on the
record that licensed florists are “very diligent about not having an exposed pick,
not having a broken wire, not have a flower that has some type of infection, like,
dirt, that remained on it”); see also SANDEFUR, supra note 74, at 134 (“[T]he
licensing scheme was a legitimate way of protecting the people of Louisiana
from scratching their fingers on the wires that florists use to hold their floral
arrangements together. This conclusion, although insufficient to pass the laugh
test, did pass the rational basis test.”).
285. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text (noting the scope of
occupational licensing).
286. See Larkin, supra note 151, at 6 (explaining that occupational licensing
burdens “fall upon people who could be even poorer than the working class
individuals whom modern-day social welfare legislation normally seeks to
protect, as well as on the general public, which is denied the benefit of the lower
prices that competition can produce”).
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2. The Freedom to Select an Occupation Is a Fundamental
Activity Protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV of the Constitution
Intermediate scrutiny also applies to rights that are
considered important, or implicate constitutional concerns. 287 The
right to pursue a “common calling” is a fundamental privilege
protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section Two, which provides that “[t]he Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States.” 288
This interpretation originated in Corfield v. Coryell. 289
Justice Washington elaborated a list of privileges and immunities
that included “the right to acquire and possess property of every
kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject
nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good of the whole.” 290 According to
Justice Washington, the Clause also protected a citizen’s right to
travel and live in any state to pursue employment. 291 The Court
has consistently found that “the pursuit of a common calling is
one of the most fundamental of those privileges protected by the
Clause.” 292
287. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996) (explaining that
categorical exclusions of one gender are constitutional violations); Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (noting that although public education is not a
constitutional right, it is important enough that denying access to education
implicates the Equal Protection Clause).
288. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; see also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948)
(“Thus we hold that commercial shrimping in the marginal sea, like other
common callings, is within the purview of the [P]rivileges and [I]mmunities
[C]lause.”).
289. 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823).
290. Id. at 551–52.
291. See id. at 552 (“The right of a citizen to pass through or to reside in any
state, for purposes of trade . . . may be mentioned as some of the particular
privileges and immunities of citizens.”).
292. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219
(1984); see also Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 283
(1985) (“We therefore conclude that the right to practice law is protected by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.”); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S.
371, 387 (1978) (describing common callings as “basic and essential activities”);
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978) (noting that the right to pursue a
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The language of Article IV, Section Two, is virtually identical
to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 293 The Privileges and Immunities Clause, however,
has been considered dead since the Slaughter-House Cases. 294
Some scholars argue that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to incorporate the fundamental privileges identified in
Corfield. 295 In comparing Justice Washington’s opinion in Corfield
and Congress’s intentions when drafting the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is evident that the framers considered the right to
pursue a common calling of one’s choice an important freedom. 296
Based on the Clause’s modern interpretation in Saenz v. Roe, 297
both the Clause and Article IV, Section Two protect a citizen’s
right to pursue fundamental activities, regardless of their state of
residency. 298
Although the primary use of Article IV, Section Two is to
protect a citizen’s right to work in different states without facing
unreasonable barriers to entry, the fundamental activity
distinction applies in this context. 299 Instead of unjustly blocking
common calling is protected within Article IV, Section Two).
293. Compare U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”),
with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.”).
294. 83 U.S. 36 (1873); see also supra note 84 and accompanying text
(discussing the effect that the Slaughter-House Cases had on the Privileges and
Immunities Clause).
295. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 526–27 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(discussing the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment).
296. See id. at 524 (explaining that the privileges and immunities language
was carried over from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution and was
understood to protect fundamental rights and liberties).
297. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
298. See id. at 503–04 (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
“the right of the newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities
enjoyed by other citizens of the same State” and that those rights are protected
by both state and national citizenship); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436
U.S. 371, 383 (1978) (“When the Privileges and Immunities Clause has been
applied to specific cases, it has been interpreted to prevent a State from
imposing unreasonable burdens on citizens of other States in their pursuit of
common callings within the State.”).
299. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (“[I]t was long ago
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out-of-state professionals, state-created barriers protect
incumbents at the expense of aspiring practitioners and
consumers. 300 The state may impose reasonable restrictions when
unregulated professions create a risk to public health and
welfare. 301 Occupational licensing laws that ensure a supply of
competent practitioners with training that is rationally connected
to the profession are reasonable laws that are essential for public
safety. 302 Restrictions designed solely to lock competitors out of a
market are not reasonable; they abuse state power and weaken
guarantees of Equal Protection. 303 Given the importance of the
right to pursue a common calling, barriers to entry into a lawful
profession should be subject to a more thorough scrutiny than
rational basis review.
3. Intermediate Scrutiny Satisfies the Need for Balance Between
the Legislature and the Judiciary
Occupational licensing laws are part of the state’s police
power. 304 The state has the right to create its own economic
policies, including licensing, but those policies must be subject to

decided that one of the privileges which the clause guarantees to Citizens of
State A is that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality with
citizens of that state.”).
300. See supra notes 147–152 and accompanying text (discussing public
choice theory and its relationship to occupational licensing).
301. See Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999) (explaining that the
right to choose a profession is “subject to reasonable government regulation”);
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121 (1889) (explaining that deprivation of
the right to work is not arbitrary “where its exercise is not permitted because of
a failure to comply with conditions imposed by the State for the protection of
society”).
302. See Larkin, supra note 22, at 311–12 (arguing that the justification for
occupational licensing is to protect the public and statutes that pose only a
trivial risk do not fit within that justification).
303. See supra note 277 and accompanying text (discussing when
government action violates the Equal Protection Clause); see also supra note 152
and accompanying text (discussing special interest groups and occupational
licensing).
304. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing licensing’s
relationship to a state’s police powers).
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meaningful judicial review. 305 Courts should balance legislative
deference with an awareness of the potential for legislative
abuse. According to Jay Wexler, intermediate scrutiny
appropriately balances judicial minimalism and oversight
because the legislature is required to explain its reasons for
enacting a statute and the policies behind the statute. 306 This
explanation assists courts in making reasoned determinations
based on actual state policies, instead of judicial speculation. 307
Intermediate scrutiny ensures that courts appropriately weigh
individual rights against government interests without
predetermining the result. 308 Given the scope of occupational
licensing and the potential harm it may inflict, it is reasonable to
require the state to develop clear reasons for licensing
restrictions and to carry the burden in judicial review. 309
4. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to Occupational Licensing
In applying intermediate scrutiny to occupational licensing, a
court must first examine the challenged legislation or regulation
to determine whether it serves an important government
objective. The state should clarify the legislation’s intended
purpose and provide evidence that the law is necessary to achieve
305. See SIEGAN, supra note 59, at 318–19 (summarizing constitutional
support for judicial review of economic legislation and noting the “judicial
purpose of providing a forum for persons aggrieved by government and serving
as a check on the other branches”).
306. See Wexler, supra note 264, at 334 (“Because the intermediate scrutiny
standard requires law-making bodies to justify their regulation in terms of
actual purposes, it forces them to articulate clearly the interests that the law is
intended to serve . . . and invite[s] debate about the true motivations for the
legislation.”).
307. See supra note 230 and accompanying text (discussing the hazards of
allowing courts to rule based on speculative government policy).
308. See Wexler, supra note 264, at 300 (explaining that intermediate
scrutiny requires courts to balance a number of factors in making a
determination).
309. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152 (1980)
(noting that the government has failed to make the proper showing to sustain
the law in question); see also SIEGAN, supra note 59, at 324 (arguing that the
government should have to persuade the court that the law serves a legitimate
purpose when applying intermediate scrutiny to economic legislation).
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the objective. Because occupational licensing is justified as part of
a state’s power to protect public health and safety, 310 the
government objective should arguably bear some relationship to
that power.
It is easy to recognize occupations that if left unregulated
would pose a threat to public health and safety. Professional
regulations for physicians are clearly constitutional under
intermediate scrutiny. 311 Licensing requirements for doctors
further an important government interest in protecting public
health and safety by ensuring that only qualified physicians
practice. 312 Medical schools offer curriculum explicitly related to
the profession, and the licensing exam is “substantially related”
to that interest. 313
In examining the challenged law, the court would consider
whether it has a “rational connection with the applicant’s fitness
or capacity to practice.” 314 For example, if the education and
training requirements were unduly burdensome, arbitrary, 315 or
310. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (explaining that
part of the state power to protect public health and safety includes regulating
professions).
311. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889) (finding that the
“law of West Virginia was intended to secure such skill and learning in the
profession of medicine that the community might trust with confidence those
receiving a license under the authority of the State”).
312. See id. at 122–23 (“Few professions require more careful preparation by
one who seeks to enter it than that of medicine. . . . Due consideration,
therefore, for the protection of society may well induce the State to exclude from
practice those who have not such a license, or who are . . . not . . . fully
qualified.”).
313. See id. at 123 (“[T]he statute only requires that whoever assumes, by
offering to the community his services as a physician, that he possesses such
learning and skill, shall present evidence of it by a certificate or license from a
body designated by the State as competent to judge of his qualifications.”).
314. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examr’s of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1972). See
also Dent, 129 U.S. at 122
If [qualifications] are appropriate to the calling or profession, and
attained by reasonable study or application, no objection to their
validity can be raised because of their stringency or difficulty. It is
only when they have no relation to such calling or profession, or are
unattainable by such reasonable study or application that they can
operate to deprive one of his right to pursue a lawful vocation.
315. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing the American
Society for Interior Designers’s multiple attempts to create strict licensing
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bore a limited relationship to the actual work of the profession as
defined by the state, as in Cornwell v. Hamilton, 316 a court could
find that the legislation fails to serve the intended government
objective. 317 Engaging in comparative analysis of licensing
requirements in other states may provide helpful guidelines for
courts trying to determine whether a state’s licensing scheme is
arbitrary or rational. 318
Another way to determine whether legislation serves its
purpose is to analyze its proportional position within the overall
state licensing structure. 319 Because the state determines which
occupations warrant licensure, inconsistencies in professional
regulation without a corresponding public safety connection may
suggest that protectionism is the real government objective. 320
The court could then consider whether alternatives such as
certification could substantially achieve the same state objectives
without creating arbitrary barriers. 321 A state’s decision to
restrictions for interior designers that just happen to correspond with ASID’s
requirements for membership).
316. 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
317. See id. at 1109 (arguing that if a state’s regulations limit training in
necessary skills for hair braiders, the state cannot argue that its regulations are
designed to protect consumers’ health because its regulations are irrelevant to
developing appropriate safety practices); see also Patel v. Texas Dep’t of
Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 90–91 (Tex. 2015) (finding that Texas’s
licensing requirements for eyebrow threaders are burdensome due to the
number of training hours not related to threading, costs of training, and delayed
employment opportunities).
318. See Cornwell, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1113–14 (noting that the rationality of
a state’s requirements can be determined by comparison to other states and
other professions to determine the appropriate relationship to public health and
safety).
319. See Larkin, Public Choice Theory, supra note 22, at 308 n.462
(discussing possible legal inquiries for licensing cases, including proof that
licensing requirements in one state are significantly more onerous than
requirements of other states).
320. See id. at 285 (“A state whose licensing matrices . . . make little (if any)
sense as a means of protecting the public safety or welfare has likely adopted
that scheme for the very different purpose of keeping safe the financial welfare
of a favored group.”).
321. See supra notes 23, 39 and accompanying text (noting that there are
less burdensome alternatives, such as certification, registration, or regular
Department of Health inspections).
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deregulate a related profession may provide guidance in
determining appropriate alternatives. 322
Although there is a reasonable concern that applying
heightened scrutiny to economic regulations could return courts to
the days of Lochner, 323 creating a limited exception for
occupational licensing does not present a significant risk. The right
to pursue a common calling is a fundamental activity 324 and
deserves greater protection. States are still free to create and apply
their own economic policies. Applying intermediate scrutiny
merely ensures that the politically powerless receive assistance
from the judiciary to guarantee that the legislature also represents
their interests in an area that is central to most people’s lives.
V. Conclusion: The Way Forward
Occupational licensing statutes serve a useful purpose, but
their utility is often clouded by legislation designed to restrict
competition and pad incumbents’ power, rather than protect the
public. 325 These statutes create arbitrary barriers to citizens’
exercise of a fundamental activity. 326 The Supreme Court’s recent
holding in North Carolina State Board provides further indication
of judicial support for blocking licensing regulations designed to
limit market competition. 327 The Texas Supreme Court recently
struck down licensing requirements for eyebrow threaders, finding
that the training requirement violated Article I, § 9 of the Texas

322. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing state policies
surrounding deregulation).
323. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (noting Justice Marshall’s
concerns about applying enhanced scrutiny to economic legislation).
324. See supra notes 288–292 and accompanying text (explaining that the
right to pursue a profession is a “fundamental activity” protected by Article
Four of the Constitution).
325. Supra Part III.B.4.
326. Supra Part IV.D.2.
327. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.
1101, 1106 (2015) (“When a State empowers a group of active market
participants to decide who can participate in its market, and on what terms, the
need for supervision is manifest.”).
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Constitution. 328 In Patel v. Texas Department of Licensing and
Regulation, 329 the Supreme Court of Texas set forth the standard
to overcome a statute’s presumption of constitutionality:
The statute’s purpose could not arguably be rationally related to
a legitimate government interest; or . . . when considered as a
whole, the statute’s actual real-world effect as applied to the
challenging party could not arguably be rationally related to, or
is so burdensome as to be oppressive in light of, the
governmental interest. 330

The first option is traditional rational basis review, but the second
standard suggests a form of heightened scrutiny. 331 It is possible
that these decisions represent the beginning of a trend away from
using traditional rational basis review in “common calling” cases.
Rational basis review is insufficient to protect against harms
caused by occupational licensing because it facilitates protectionist
legislation and fosters confusion among courts over what
constitutes a legitimate interest.332
Intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard to apply
because it considers legislative interests while placing the burden
on the law’s proponents, limiting the problem of regulatory
capture. 333 Enhancing the standard of review protects individual
rights and restores a check to the system of checks and balances by
requiring that occupational licensing serve its real purpose:
protecting public health and safety.
328. See Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 90
(Tex. 2015) (concluding that unrelated training hours, expenses for training,
and the associated delays in practicing prove that “the requirement of 750 hours
of training to become licensed is not just unreasonable or harsh, but it is so
oppressive that it violates Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution”). Article I, § 9
provides that “[n]o citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property,
privileges or immunities, or in any manner disenfranchised, except by due
course of the law of the land.” TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
329. 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015).
330. Id. at 124–25 (Boyd, J. concurring).
331. See id. at 123–25 (Boyd, J. concurring) (explaining that the standard of
review for due course challenges to economic regulation includes the additional
consideration of whether the “statute’s effect as a whole is so unreasonably
burdensome that it becomes oppressive in relation to the underlying
governmental interest”).
332. Supra Part IV.A.1–2.
333. Supra Part IV.D.3.

